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ABSTRACT
Robert Hunter M orris was born in 1713 to one of colonial Am erica’s 
most prominent families. From  1693 until 1746, his father, Lewis M orris, was 
an important political leader in both New York and New Jersey. In 1738, the 
elder M orris became governor of New Jersey. W orking alongside his father, 
Robert Hunter Morris earned a reputation as both a brilliant jurist and a 
stridently authoritarian politician.
In 1746, Thomas Penn became the chief proprietor o f Pennsylvania. 
During the preceeding half century, Pennsylvania’s elected legislature had 
steadily gained political and financial power at the expense of the executive 
authority embodied by the Penn family. Thomas Penn sought to restore the 
predominance he felt was his as proprietor. By the early 1750s, relations 
between proprietor and Assembly had deteriorated into a political deadlock that 
threatened to bring Pennsylvania’s governmental processes to a standstill.
Over the course of the eighteenth century, Pennsylvania gradually 
abandoned the Quaker principles of benevolence and honesty when acquiring 
Delaware Indian lands. A strong alliance between Pennsylvania’s government 
and the pro-British Iroquois had stripped the increasingly resentful Delawares of 
much of their homeland. By the early 1750s, the French presence on the Ohio 
River threatened Pennsylvania’s frontier. W ar between Great Britain and 
France loomed.
Into Pennsylvnia’s increasingly complex and dangerous situation, Thomas 
Penn inserted the tactless and uncompromising Robert Hunter M orris as 
governor. Arriving in Philadelphia in October 1754, Governor M orris 
antagonized the pacifist Assembly at every turn and helped to worsen an 
already volatile political situation. He supported Thomas Penn’s designs on 
Delaware land while cynically attempting to muster Indian support for the 
British military campaign against the French. His desire to win the favor of 
both Penn and the British imperial authorities blinded him to the importance of 
securing the loyalty of the Delawares on the Susquehanna and Ohio rivers.
Their violent uprising against Pennsylvania followed the British defeat on the 
Ohio. W hile the undefended frontier burned, he dismissed longstanding 
Delaware grievances as fabrication and categorized the Indians who attacked the 
Pennsylvania frontier as mercenaries of the French. M orris’s refusal to 
compromise with the Assembly or to address Indian concerns made his 
administration a political and diplomatic failure. He left office in August 1756.
v
ROBERT HUNTER MORRIS AND THE POLITICS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1754-1755
INTRODUCTION
In October 1754, Robert Hunter Morris arrived in Philadelphia to take 
up his duties as governor of Pennsylvania.1 Morris served for only twenty-two 
months, but his tenure embraced the collapse of the seventy-year "Long Peace" 
that had heretofore distinguished the colony from the rest of Great Britain’s 
North American provinces. In July 1755, the French and Indian victory over 
General Braddock’s army on land claimed by Pennsylvania heralded the Seven 
Years W ar and punctuated the first half of M orris’s administration. In late 
November, the long-suffering Delawares launched an uprecedented war against 
the colony’s western settlements that consumed the remainder of his term.
Thomas Penn had bestowed the governorship on M orris with a mandate 
to restore the declining power of the proprietary interest at the expense of the 
Quaker-dominated Assembly. When war broke out on the frontier, M orris was
1 Thomas Penn, was in fact Pennsylvania’s governor by virtue of his position as 
principal proprietor. If the proprietor resided in Pennsylvania, he would have 
served as governor. Since Penn had elected to conduct his affairs from England 
by this time, he appointed a series of deputy or lieutenant governors to act in 
his stead. In correspondence and in discourse, a deputy governor was addressed 
and referred to simply as the "governor" and consequently that form will be 
used here throughout. The deputy governor was bound by his commission "to 
obey the expressed will of his superior" through written instructions issued by 
the proprietor. See William Robert Shepherd, History of Proprietary 
Government in Pennsylvania (New York, 1896), 474 ff.
2
3engaged in a bitter struggle with the legislature over military appropriations.
The formulation of Pennsylvania’s response to the Delaware uprising forced the 
issues of proprietary land rights, the colony’s relations with the imperial 
government, the viability of a pacifist legislature in time of war, and the failure 
of the provincial Indian policy into the general dispute between governor and 
Assembly.
Morris was a vitriolic partisan poorly suited to manage a crisis that 
called for a skilled political negotiator and diplomat who recognized the 
importance of Pennsylvania’s Indian allies. His reputation for contentious 
arrogance was well established when he became governor o f Pennsylvania. (In 
fairness, he was also noted for his brilliant legal mind and as a capable 
administrator). M orris served an intensive political apprenticeship under his 
father, Lewis Morris, who had been one of colonial New Y ork’s most volatile 
and self-serving party leaders. Lewis later brought a harsh and autocratic style 
to the office of governor of New Jersey. The younger Morris consistently 
reflected his father’s manner and ideology in his own legal and political career. 
Robert Hunter M orris directed Pennsylvania’s Indian affairs guided almost 
exclusively by the dual consideration of advancing Thomas Penn’s political 
agenda and enhancing his own reputation within London’s imperial 
administration.
CHAPTER I
ROBERT HUNTER MORRIS: THE MAKING OF A POLITICIAN
Robert Hunter M orris was born in 1713 at M orrisania in W estchester 
County, New York, the youngest son of Lewis Morris and Isabella Graham 
M orris.2 His father was a landed aristocrat who derived his considerable 
wealth from manor estates in New York and New Jersey and was intimately 
involved in the politics of both colonies.
As a provincial politician, Lewis . M orris was a volatile m ixture o f moral 
rectitude and calculated self-interest. His seemingly inexhaustable capacity for 
charging into partisan disputes kept him at or near the center of political 
activity in his two home colonies for over half a century.3 The elder M orris 
fostered his son’s entrance into both provincial and imperial political circles and
2 The Dictionary of American Biography incorrectly gives "c.1700" as the date 
o f R .H . M orris’s birth. This error has made its way into both scholarly and 
popular works on the colonial history of Pennsylvania and it obscures M orris’s 
precocious entry into provincial politics. In fact, R .H . M orris was only forty- 
one years old when he became governor of Pennsylvania in 1754 and had 
already served as New Jersey’s chief justice for fifteen years. See J.A . Krout 
"Robert Hunter M orris" Dictionary of American Biography (New York: 
Scribner, 1943), XIII, 225; Beverly McAnear, "An American in London, 1735- 
1736," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography. LXIV, 2, 165; 
Eugene R. Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 1671-1746 (Syracuse, 1981), 94.
3 Patricia Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New 
York (New York, 1971), 104.
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5profoundly influenced his public behavior. Robert Hunter M orris’s introduction 
to politics apparently began at an early age. In his Autobiography. Benjamin 
Franklin recounted that he had heard it was Lewis M orris’s custom to have his 
children "dispute with one another for his Diversion while sitting at Table after 
D inner."4
Lewis M orris first became involved in government in New Jersey. In 
1693, at the age of of twenty-two, he was appointed to the New Jersey 
provincial council.5 Eight years later, he travelled to England as the agent for 
the East Jersey Board of Proprietors. His persuasive pleading before the Board 
of Trade helped convince the imperial administration to grant New Jersey a 
royal government.6 Morris later shifted his primary political interests to New 
York and there became a powerful member of the Assembly.
While serving in the New York legislature, M orris formed a close 
political alliance with Governor Robert Hunter who presided over the
4 The Autobiography of Beniamin Franklin. R. Jackson Wilson, ed.,(N ew  
York, 1981), 166-67.
5 John E. Pomfret, The New Jersey Proprietors and Their Lands (Princeton, 
1964), 83.
6 John E. Pomfret, Colonial New Jersey- A History (New York, 1973), 85. 
Disturbed over the state of political anarchy in New Jersey, M orris and his 
sponsors on the East Jersey Board were convinced that royal government would 
allow the landed aristocracy to maintain control over the colony. See Sheridan, 
Lewis M orris. 34.
6governments o f both New York and New Jersey from 1710 to 1719.7 The two 
men also developed a deep personal friendship attested to by M orris’s naming 
his youngest son for the governor. In 1715, Lewis Morris was appointed chief 
justice of New York. He also served as an effective legislative manager for 
Governor Hunter and the latter’s successor, William Burnet.8 Hunter aided 
M orris in forging a strong legislative party initially "based upon patronage, 
discipline, economic protection for artisans, shopkeepers, and yeoman farmers, 
and toleration for [religious] dissenters."9
But Lewis Morris was no champion of the masses. Behind the 
"Morrisite" faction’s appeals to the middling classes lay a firm resolve toward 
maintaining New Y ork’s landed gentry as the dominant political power in the 
colony. The Morrisites also opposed the growing influence of New Y ork’s 
urban m erchants.10 In New York, political factions manipulated the electorate 
in a continuous struggle for control of the Assembly and the furtherance of their 
respective economic and political interests. In the 1720s, the party headed by 
Adolph Philipse, M orris’s chief rival, grew in influence. After the elections of
7 Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People. 79. From 1702 to 1738, New York 
and New Jersey were ruled by the same royal governor although each colony 
possessed its own legislature and judiciaryes. See Pomfret, New Jersey 
Proprietors and Their Lands, xi.
8 Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 94-96, 113-14, 123-24.
9 Kammen, Colonial New Y ork. 203.
io Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 118-19.
71728, the Morrisites constituted the largest opposition group in the Assem bly.11
In late 1732, William Cosby became governor o f New York. W ithin a 
few months M orris and the new governor became locked in a prolonged and 
bitter conflict. Before Cosby’s appointment, a New York merchant named Rip 
Van Dam had served as interim governor. Citing a royal instruction, Cosby 
demanded half the salary that Van Dam had collected during his thirteen 
months in office. Van Dam refused the governor’s order and Cosby resolved 
to settle the matter in court. W hen Chief Justice M orris attempted to block the 
governor’s legal strategy, Cosby quickly removed him from office.
M orris now headed what was commonly known as the "Country" party 
against the "Court" party of Governor Cosby and the Philipse faction. In the 
mid-eighteenth century, the terms "court" and "country" carried political 
meaning throughout the British empire. The court party was popularly 
understood to include those who controlled the inner workings of a given 
government. The country faction, often comprise of landed gentry, ostensibly 
represented the citizenry at large.12
Inflamed by what he saw as Cosby’s high-handed and irregular behavior, 
M orris embarked on a crusade "which, in terms of ideology and tactics, was
11 Kammen, Colonial New Y ork. 203-205. The most complete discussion of the 
factionalism of New York provincial politics in the mid-eighteenth century and 
the Morris-Cosby dispute can be found in Bonomi, A Factious People. 105,
140 ff.
\
12 Kammen, Colonial New Y ork. 203.
8the boldest and most imaginative political opposition in New York before the 
era of the American Revolution." M orris broke with the partisan rhetoric used 
in past disputes by framing his attacks against the governor in constitutional 
terms. Despite being a political outsider at this point, he cast himself as a 
defender of the royal prerogative, fending off the usurpations of the governor 
and calling into question the legitimacy of the provincial judicial system.
M orris and the Country party began their struggle against Cosby and the Court 
party within the context of provincial politics and carried it to the highest levels 
of the imperial administration in London.13
M orris and his colleagues sought to turn public opinion against the 
governor by tarring Cosby as an arbitrary and incompetent ruler. In late 1733, 
M orris stood for election to a vacant seat in the Assembly representing the 
borough of W estchester. Morris designed his campaign to serve as a 
referendum on the Country party’s opposition to Cosby. The Court party 
enlisted a candidate to run against Morris and the W estchester election drew the 
attention of the entire colony. M orris won at the polls and proceeded to 
Manhattan to take his newly-won seat in the Assembly. His arrival in the city 
was met with a resounding show of popular support. Governor Cosby 
countered by adjourning the Assembly until the spring of 1734.14
13 Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 148, 156-57.
14 Ibid.; Bonomi, A Factious People, 114.
9Shortly after the election, the first issue of the New York Weekly 
Journal appeared in print. Financed and largely written by M orris and his 
colleagues, the newspaper served as the mouthpiece for the Country party.
From  its pages, the Country party levelled an unrelenting stream of criticism at 
the governor. M orris’s use o f a serial publication as a propaganda weapon 
constituted a major innovation which changed the course o f future political 
campaigns in colonial New Y ork.15
M orris also criticized Cosby in letters and petitions to the Board of 
Trade and the Privy Council. The Country party’s second strategy in the 
M orris-Cosby dispute was to carry the fight before the imperial authorities in 
London and to apply for redress of grievances against the governor. In 
November M orris complained of poor health and slyly requested that he be 
excused from attendance at the Assembly in order to return "home." He 
promptly set sail for England as the agent for the Country party .16
Robert Hunter M orris, then twenty-one, accompanied his father to 
England and served as his private secretary. Like most members of the
15 Ibid., 137. The printer of M orris’s New York Weekly Journal was John 
Peter Zenger. In 1734, Cosby ordered the newspaper shut down and Zenger 
was arrested for libel. Zenger’s subsequent trial and acquittal has traditionally 
been hailed as a milestone in the "advancement" o f the free press in American 
history. The significance of the Zenger trial lies more in its demonstration of 
the growing importance of the political press. See Kammen, Colonial New 
Y ork. 206-207.
16 Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 153, 162-63.
10
colonial elite, Lewis M orris seems to have regarded a prolonged exposure to 
the intricacies of the imperial administration (and London in general) as a fitting 
capstone to his son’s education. During his year and a half in London, Robert 
kept a diary of his activities and documented the progress of his father’s 
mission. Many of the contacts the father and son established were with other 
colonial agents and also naval officers with whom the elder M orris had become 
acquainted in New York. Lewis found that London’s political scene had 
changed since his visit thirty years earlier. The bureaucracy had grown in size 
and complexity and he found that obtaining access to government officials had 
become considerably more difficult.17
By the summer of 1736, Lewis Morris had become thoroughly 
disenchanted with London politics. His varied machinations had failed to bring 
about Cosby’s removal and his appeals for reinstatement as chief justice were 
denied by the Privy Council. With characteristic self-righteousness, both 
M orrises returned to New York embittered over what they saw as endemic 
corruption within the royal governm ent.18 The London mission signalled the 
end of Lewis M orris’s influence in New York, but his political career was far 
from over.
The Duke of Newcastle, the secretary of state for the southern
17 Ibid., 163; McAnear, "An American in London," 165, 170-71.
18 Ibid., 176; Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 176.
11
department, had offered Lewis M orris the governorship of New Jersey, which 
was now to be made separate from that of New York. In return, Newcastle 
asked M orris to withdraw his charges against Cosby. While in London, M orris 
stubbornly declined the offer on principle. Morris felt his personal honor 
inextricably linked to his campaign against Cosby. However, the prospect of 
obtaining a governorship rekindled his ambition. After his return to New York 
and the death of Governor Cosby, Morris actively sought the position. The 
imperial officials who supported M orris’s appointment overestimated his 
residual political strength in New York. Their prime objective in placing 
Morris at the head of New Jersey’s government was to remove the quarrelsome 
party leader from the volatile political situation in New Y ork.19
In August 1738, Lewis M orris took office as governor of New Jersey. 
Ensconced in a position of executive authority, Morris quickly abandoned the 
independent^ reform-minded ideology he had espoused as the leader of New 
Y ork’s Country party. His distrust of the imperial administration was soon 
supplanted by the realization that his position as governor depended upon 
support from London. Morris no longer invoked the royal prerogative as a 
limitation on the power of New Y ork’s governor, but rather as a bulwark 
against the encroachments of the New Jersey Assembly.20 Although nearing the
19 Ibid., 180; Bonomi A Factious People. 133-134.
20 Ibid., 182.
12
age of seventy, M orris had lost none of his zeal for political combat. Historian 
John Pomfret has demonstrated that as governor, Morris "strove unremittingly 
to impose his will on the assembly and employed every weapon within his 
control, including the sanctity of the governor’s instructions and frequent 
appeals to the crown and the prerogative."21
Historians have taken note of the apparent contradictions in Lewis 
M orris’s political persona. Michael Kammen allowed that the rapidly changing 
political climate occasioned similar turnabouts in the governor’s 
contemporaries. Nonetheless Kammen characterized M orris’s behavior during 
the New York factional struggles of the 1730s as that of an "ideological 
cham eleon."22 Patricia Bonomi suggested that historians have been "too eager" 
to criticize M orris’s "courtly conduct" as governor of New Jersey and his role 
in the political turmoil that ensued. In her opinion, M orris’s political 
difficulties might be more readily explained by "his rigid personality than from 
inconsistency of principles."23
M orris’s most recent biographer, Eugene R. Sheridan, found nothing 
"peculiar" about the governor’s espousal of both court and country ideologies 
except the "intensity" with which he could embrace either when confronted 
with a political obstacle. For Sheridan, "the key to understanding M orris lies
21 Pomfret, Colonial New Jersey. 148.
22 Kammen, Colonial New Y ork. 205.
23 Bonomi, A Factious People, n.132.
13
in his lifelong effort to uphold his pretensions as a landed aristocrat.” M orris, 
Sheridan points out, consistently upheld the interests of the aristocracy and saw 
himself as ’’one of the natural leaders of society whose guidance the lower 
orders should accept and whose status royal officials should respect." While 
M orris believed in balanced government, "it seemed as if the only governments 
he considered unbalanced were those controlled by his adversaries.”24
Robert Hunter M orris was both a close student and a beneficiary of his 
father’s governorship. The younger Morris began and ended his career as an 
appointed official and never waged a political battle as an outsider, as his father 
had done. While serving as his father’s secretary in London, he had proven 
himself a trustworthy and competent assistant with a talent for political debate. 
In his history of New York, W illiam Smith, Jr. later described Robert Hunter 
M orris as a "solicitor o f no mean art and address."25 W hen Lewis received his 
instructions as governor, he was no doubt pleased to find that his son, still only 
in his mid-twenties, was listed among the provincial councillors.26 Father and 
son worked closely together. Robert’s presence on the provincial council 
allowed the governor to closely monitor its activities while attending to other
24 Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 206.
25 William Smith, J r., The History of the Province of New-York. Michael 
Kammen, ed. (Cambridge,Massachusetts, 1972), II, 114.
26 McAnear "An American in London," 166.
14
business.27
W ithin a year Lewis appointed his son chief justice of New Jersey, but 
made a liberal gesture by placing the office beyond the governor’s control. 
Robert was the first chief justice of the province who held his commission 
"during good behavior" rather than "during the royal pleasure."28 W hile the 
charge of nepotism could scarcely be avoided, the younger M orris exhibited a 
capable (if biased) administrative hand while on the court. "He came young 
into the office of chief justice," his contemporary, Samuel Smith noted, but 
"stuck to punctuality in the forms of the courts, reduced the pleadings to 
precision and method, and possessed the great qualities of his office, knowledge 
and integrity, in more perfection than had often been known in the colonies. "29 
In the 1740s, Robert Hunter Morris became deeply involved in New 
Jersey’s longstanding land problems. Since the seventeenth-century, the so- 
called Nicolls patentees and the East Jersey proprietors had been adversaries in 
a complicated dispute over land tenure in New Jersey.30 As a powerful member
27 Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 182.
28 J.A . Krout, "Robert Hunter M orris," 225.
29 Samuel Smith, The History of The Colony of Nova-Caesaria. or New-Jersey 
(Burlington, New Jersey, 1765), 439.
30 In 1664, the Duke of York appointed Richard Nicolls as governor o f his 
proprietary which then included the future colonies of New York and New 
Jersey. Nicolls issued two immense grants in East Jersey totalling 750,000 
acres o f land. The recipients were largely Puritan settlers from Long Island. 
Unbeknownst to Nicolls, the Duke of York had granted the province of New 
Jersey to Sir George Carteret and Lord John Berkeley shortly thereafter. The
15
of the provincial council, Robert worked to block legislation which might 
benefit the patentees.31 The office of chief justice carried the authority to 
commission the other justices of the court who in turn appointed the colony’s 
law enforcement officials.32 In 1742, the younger M orris was appointed to the 
East Jersey Board of Proprietors.
By the mid-1740s, Robert Hunter M orris and James Alexander had 
emerged as the leaders of the proprietary interest.33 On behalf o f the East 
Jersey Board they inundated the courts with lawsuits against small landholders 
with questionable titles as well as outright squatters. In a majority o f the cases, 
the proprietors succeeded in obtaining ejectments. The losers in these suits 
were faced with the choice of leaving the land or becoming quitrent-paying 
tenants.34
East Jersey proprietors derived their claim from Cateret and Berkeley and 
maintained that they were entitled to receive quitrents from the "Nicolls 
patentees." The Duke of York’s subsequent disavowal of the Nicolls grants and 
numerous court rulings against individual patentees had failed to settle the 
dispute by the middle of the eighteenth century. See Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 
18-20,198-99; Pomfret, New Jersey Proprietors and Their Lands. 8-10,56,108- 
09.
31 Pomfret, Colonial New Jersey. 156.
32 Peter O. W acker, Land and People. A Cultural Geography of Preindustrial 
New Jersey: Origins and Settlement Patterns (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 
1975), 354.
33 J.A . Krout "Robert Hunter M orris," XIII, 225; Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 198.
34 Pomfret, Colonial New Jersey. 158.
16
Not only did M orris and the proprietors seek to invalidate the land 
claims of the Nicolls patentees, they sought to nullify land titles that some 
settlers had obtained initially from the Delaware Indians. The proprietors 
derisively characterized these titles as having been purchased "from strolling 
Indians for a few Bottles of Rum ."35 Between 1741 and 1743, the proprietors 
brought several suits against white farmers who traced their ownership to Indian 
deeds. The proprietors won virtually all the suits and were subsequently 
accused of jury tampering by the frustrated "quitrenters."36 In 1749, M orris 
struck at the very root of the Indian land title question when he argued against 
Indian rights to the land on which the few remaining Delawares in New Jersey 
were living.37
By 1745, M orris and Alexander had made significant gains against the 
patentees in the courts. The East Jersey proprietors then sought to obtain a 
comprehensive settlement in their favor. Jonathan Belcher and Morris had 
spent three years preparing what became known as the Elizabethtown Bill in 
Chancery. The bill challenged the land titles o f sixty prominent patentees and 
contained a compelling defense of proprietary rights. According to law, the
35 Quoted in Pomfret, New Jersey Proprietors and Their Lands. 110. In 1683, 
the New Jersey assembly had prohibited the purchase of Indian lands except by 
those who had obtained license from the governor. Subsequently, the purchase 
of Indian land had been placed under the control of the proprietors.
36 Ibid., 109
37 W acker, Land and People. 90.
17
governor served as the judge on the New Jersey Court of Chancery. W ith 
Lewis M orris on the bench, the patentees saw the verdict as a foregone 
conclusion.38 Although morally indefensible in the minds of the besieged 
patentees and their growing ranks of sympathizers, the proprietors’ arguments 
rested on firm legal ground. W ith no other viable outlet, popular sentiment 
against the East Jersey Board erupted into violence. For a decade the colony 
was plagued with a series of "land riots." Mobs attacked local jails to free 
imprisoned patentees and those being held for removing timber from 
unoccupied proprietary lands. The governor and council viewed these 
disturbances as treasonable offenses and moved to suppress the lawlessness.39
While few openly sanctioned the violence, many members o f the newly- 
elected Assembly of 1746 echoed the grievances of the rioters. W hen the 
council drafted a stringent "anti-insurrection" bill over and above the existing 
militia laws, the Assembly refused to pass it.40 Robert Hunter M orris was 
unmoved by the growing perception in the lower house that the East Jersey 
proprietors were greedy predators bent on deepening the misery of the poor.
For him the issue was a simple matter of law versus anarchy. W ith the power
38 Pomfret, Colonial New Jersey. 153; Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 198.
39 Pomfret, Colonial New Jersey. 151, 156; Kemmerer, Path To Freedom . 
198,200; Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 198. In the chapter entitled "Manifest 
Destiny at the Proprietors’ Expense," Kemmerer exposes the often specious 
legal grounds on which New Jersey settlers based their land claims. See pp. 
187-204.
40 Kemmerer, Path to Freedom . 199.
18
of law on his side, Morris sought to push the proprietary advantage to the limit, 
regardless of the political or social consequences. After the first outbreak of 
violence, he expressed his thoughts on the rioters and their sympathizers in a 
few lines of smug doggerel: "No man is safe in property or fame, W here laws 
are broken or where laws are lame, Much less when force suspends all legal 
right, Making men wrongfully submitt to might. "41
In 1748, Chief Justice Morris ordered John Ferdinand Paris, the East 
Jersey Board’s London agent, to petition the royal government for troops to put 
down the riots. M orris exhibited a somewhat inflated sense of his own 
importance and apparently misjudged the degree of urgency that New Jersey’s 
sporadic land riots might arouse in London. Paris replied that he would speak 
to the proper authorities, but calmly reminded the young chief justice that 
Britain was then at war on the continent and that there were "many other affairs 
near home to employ our great m ens’ time & thoughts."42
In 1749, the New Jersey General Assembly sent a petition to King 
George II in which they asserted their loyalty to the crown but explained the 
cause of the disturbances in terms sympathetic to the rioters. The Assembly 
portrayed the conflict as one of rich against poor and hinted that a small 
number o f test cases might have peacefully settled the land issue. Citing the
41 Quoted in ibid., 198.
42 Quoted in ibid., 202.
19
younger M orris and Alexander by name, the legislators complained that the two 
proprietary leaders had shown a " Disposition to harass [the] People by a 
Multiplicity o f Suits." The Assembly subtly pointed out that M orris was in fact 
a plaintiff in most of the suits as well as the chief judicial authority in the 
province. In addition, they charged that the patentees had been burdened with 
"extraordinary and unnecessary Charges" in providing for their legal defense 
and appealed on their behalf to the crown "from whom they might expect 
impartial Justice."43 In an effort to outflank the patentees, the East Jersey 
Board had gone to the expense of retaining the services of most o f the colony’s 
practicing attorneys. One group of patentees grew so frustrated in their attempt 
to secure legal counsel that they abandoned a test case against a proprietor. 
Others were forced to hire lawyers from other colonies to defend themselves in 
court.44
Lewis M orris died in May 1746 in the midst of the land riots and the 
continuing legal battles and Jonathan Belcher was appointed to succeed him. 
Belcher had previously been manuevered out o f the governorship of 
Massachusetts after staunchly resisting his legislature’s popular attempts to pass 
paper money bills. As one historian summed it up, the experience had
43 Quoted in W acker, Land and People. 354.
44 Pomfret, New Jersey Proprietors and Their Lands, 110; W acker, Land and 
People, 355.
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impressed upon Belcher the notion that "to antagonize was not to ru le."45 The 
new governor quickly earned the enmity of Robert Hunter Morris and the 
proprietors. M orris had hoped to succeed his father in office and was less than 
enthusiastic over Belcher’s appointment.46 After his father’s death, by virtue of 
his positions as chief justice and leading member of the the provincial council, 
Robert had been temporarily in control o f New Jersey’s government.47 Despite 
Belcher’s conservative credentials, the proprietors were immediately suspicious 
of the governor’s connections with prominent Quakers and his ambivalent 
attitude toward proprietary estates and the collection of quitrents.48
Governor Belcher did not wish to alienate the Assembly. M uch to the 
dismay of the proprietors, Belcher allowed the passage of several money bills 
which Governor Lewis Morris had repeatedly overturned. Furthermore,
Belcher seemed unwilling to press the legislature into taking action against the 
rioters. M orris dismissed the governor’s cooperation with the Assembly as 
incompetence and later asserted that Belcher was in sympathy with the rioters.49
45 Pomfret, Colonial New Jersey. 152,161.
46 Kemmerer, Path to Freedom . 209. During his last years, Lewis M orris had 
attempted to persuade the London authorities that in the event of his sudden 
death, the interest of the colony would be best served by a standing 
appointment for his son to become governor. Kemmerer found that a 
commission as governor had
47 M cAnear, "An American in London," 166.
48 Kemmerer, Path to Freedom . 208-09.
49 Ibid., 218-19; Pomfret Colonial New Jersey. 162.
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From London, John Ferdinand Paris wrote to M orris that Belcher’s 
reluctance to act against the rioters had finally aroused the Board of Trade’s 
concern. The Board had considered the deployment of royal troops to restore 
order in New Jersey as well as the reunification of the colony’s governorship 
with that of New York. Also at issue was the settlement of the boundary 
between the two colonies. A survey of the boundary meant that the East Jersey 
proprietors stood to lose or gain several thousand acres of land along the New 
York line. W ith the attention of the Board of Trade drawn toward New Jersey, 
fundamental changes in both imperial policy and governmental appointments 
affecting the colony seemed imminent. For the ambitious M orris, London 
seemed rife with opportunity. So in late 1749 he set sail for England, but not 
before writing ahead to Paris asking that the proprietary agent urge the Board 
of Trade to withold any decisions on New Jersey pending his arrival.50
Historian Donald L. Kemmerer argued that M orris’s foremost objective 
in going to England was to obtain a governorship. At the time of M orris’s 
departure, Belcher’s future as governor of New Jersey seemed doubtful.51 
However, M orris’s prospects were not limited to New Jersey. He had recently 
found a political ally in Governor George Clinton of New York. Ideologically,
50 Kemmerer, Path to Freedom . 223; Pomfret, Colonial New Jersey. 163.
51 Kemmerer, Path to Freedom . 224.
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both Clinton and Morris held staunchly imperialist views. Clinton’s attempts to 
induce the New York legislature to provide extensive financial support for King 
George’s W ar had met with resistance. James De Lancey, the Chief Justice of 
New York, was Clinton’s chief political opponent. De Lancey formed a 
coalition of merchants who shared a decidedly provincial outlook. They were 
reluctant to support war measures that would disrupt New Y ork’s lucrative fur 
trade with French Canada and threaten relations with the Iroquois.52
On a more immediate level, the Clinton-Morris alliance hinged on a 
mutual desire to curtail De Lancey’s influence in New York. De Lancey was 
already a political thorn in Clinton’s side and Morris saw him as a threat to the 
interests o f the East Jersey proprietors. Chief Justice De Lancey was to lead a 
New York delegation in the upcoming boundary settlement with New Jersey. 
Clinton offered to support M orris for the office of lieutenant-governor o f New 
York if the latter would present a memorial against De Lancey to the king.53 
Clinton would continue to hold the office of governor, but planned to return to 
England, leaving Morris as his lieutenant to preside over the governm ent.54 
M orris’s willingness to jo in  the fight against De Lancey stemmed from more 
than recent political developments. William Smith observed that the New 
Jersey chief justice "undertook the office with the more cheerfulness from the
52 Kammen, Colonial New Y ork. 306.
53 Kemmerer, Path to Freedom . 224.
54 M cAnear, "An American in London," 168.
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animosity which had long subsisted between the families of M orris and De 
Lancey."55
M orris remained in England for five years and returned to America not 
with the governorship of New Jersey or New York but that o f Pennsylvania. 
Jonathan Belcher continued as governor o f New Jersey until his death in 1757. 
In London, M orris presented a persuasive case against Belcher, but the Board 
of Trade considered his overwrought accusations to be extreme. Several New 
Jersey petitions against the proprietors reached London, which provided the 
Board with a more balanced view of the land troubles. John Pomfret remarked 
that M orris "as usual, pressed too hard ."56
In New York, Governor Clinton failed to secure a majority in the 
General Assembly despite his unprecedented level of involvement in local 
election campaigns. In 1750, De Lancey’s adherents won convincingly at the 
polls. Clinton wrote to a sympathetic Morris in London asking that he "either 
get the C. Justice or myself removed, for it is impossible that I can maintain his 
[Majesty’s] Prerogative in opposition to the Influence & crafty Wiles o f him at 
the head of the Faction."57
After the election victories o f the De Lancey faction, political tensions
55 Smith, History of New York. II, 114.
56 Pomfret, Colonial New Jersey. 163-64.
57 Quoted in Bonomi, A Factious People. 162-63.
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cooled in New Y ork.58 When the New Jersey Assembly passed an act 
establishing the colony’s northern boundary, many New York landowners 
objected to the claim. Suddenly, Robert Hunter M orris’s close association with 
the East Jersey proprietors became a political liability for George Clinton. 
M orris’s commission as lieutenant-governor sat unsigned on the secretary of 
state’s office in Whitehall for several months. Finally, in the interest of 
political harmony, Clinton backed away from his support o f the contentious 
M orris. De Lancey ultimately became New Y ork’s lieutenant governor. In 
May 1752, a London agent closed a letter to the speaker of the New York 
Assembly by assuring him that "the intended commission to Mr. M orris as 
Lieutenant Governor, is quite laid aside." The agent then continued that he 
could not "conclude without expressing sincere wishes that a good 
understanding may be restored between the several branches of your 
Legislature. "59 M orris’s penchant for political dispute and his uncompromising 
style had again thwarted his ambitions.
Convinced that his proven abilities would not be overlooked, M orris 
continued to ingratiate himself with London’s political elite. He began building 
on an earlier aquaintence with Thomas Penn while in London. His political 
association with Penn had begun during the legal battles between the East
58 Kammen, Colonial New Y ork. 306.
59 Quoted in Smith, A History of New Y ork. 128.
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Jersey proprietors and the Nicolls patentees. As a member of Pennsylvania’s 
proprietary family, Thomas Penn was concerned over the number o f New 
Jersey squatters spilling westward over the Delaware River. Penn supported 
and aided the legal efforts of the East Jersey proprietors. In 1746, Thomas 
Penn inherited his elder brother’s share of the family interest in Pennsylvania. 
W ith a controlling three-fourths share, Penn became the principal proprietor of 
the colony.60 In December 1749, Morris briefly noted in his diary that he had 
met with Penn. The proprietor offered to introduce M orris to the Duke of 
Bedford, the secretary of state for the southern department and the official 
responsible for political appointments in the royal colonies.61 Ultimately, Penn 
himself would fulfill M orris’s ambition for a colonial governorship.
60 W acker, Land and People. 359. Thomas Penn was the second son of W illiam 
Penn by his second marriage. After the death of his elder brother John in 
1746, Thomas Penn became the controlling proprietor o f Pennsylvania. See 
Charles P. Keith, Chronicles of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1917), II, 739-743, 
886-887 for the circumstances and agreements under which the proprietorship 
of Pennsylvania devolved from William Penn the founder to his sons and heirs.
61 M cAnear, "An American in London," 405. Only a small fragment survives 
of the diary that M orris kept in London from 1749 to 1754.
CHAPTER II
POLITICS AND INDIAN AFFAIRS IN PENNSYLVANIA BEFORE 1754
I. The Proprietary Interest and Robert Hunter Morris.
Thomas Penn harbored a bold political design when he became 
proprietor and chief executive of Pennsylvania in 1746. Penn had watched with 
growing concern as the Assembly had increased its power over the previous 
two decades. The new proprietor desired to roll back the political gains of the 
Assembly and to reassert the proprietary interest as a means o f restoring 
balance to Pennsylvania’s government. Penn’s initiative rested ostensibly on 
the Whig principle of separation of powers. He distrusted his legislature and 
believed that it had engaged in a conscious and concerted effort to weaken the 
executive’s authority.62
The rise of the Assembly was due less to calculation than to a series of 
opportunities seized. Historian Theodore Thayer remarked that the 
"extraordinary powers" granted the Assembly by the 1701 Charter o f Privileges 
"were subject to broad construction in favor of republican government, and the
62 James H. Hutson, Pennsylvania Politics. 1746-1770 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1972), 6.
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Assembly made the most of them ."63 In the two decades before Thomas Penn’s 
ascendancy, the Assembly had maintained that its legislative authority emanated 
from the colony’s royal charter and not from the proprietor.64 In such a climate 
the maintenance of the Penn family’s prerogative and the desired balance 
between legislature and executive demanded assertive proprietary leadership. 
However, as William S. Hanna argued, the Assembly’s path was cleared by the 
"confusion, distraction, and poverty [that] were the hallmarks of the proprietary 
family after the death of William Penn. "65
By 1750, the Assembly largely directed the colony’s finances. The 
legislature held for its own use the interest derived from paper money bills and 
also controlled the expenditure of other sources of revenue. Thus provisioned, 
the Assembly was able to cast its considerable influence at home as well as in 
England virtually free from proprietary restraint. At the same time, the 
Assembly sought to regulate proprietary income from tolls, fines, escheats, 
licenses, and even the family’s coveted quitrents. Penn saw the Assembly’s 
comparative wealth as the source which enabled the legislators to infringe on 
proprietary authority in a number of areas, not the least of which was Indian
............................—  ■— ..................................... s
63 Theodore Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy. 
1740-1776 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 
1953), 5.
64 Allen Rogers, Empire and Liberty: American Resistance to British Authority, 
1755-1763 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 8.
65 W illiam S. Hanna, Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics (Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1964), 15. '
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affairs.66
The dispersal of presents among the indigenous Delawares and the other 
tribes who settled within Pennsylvania’s boundaries was an integral part o f the 
colony’s Indian policy. W hatever measure o f Indian passivity and good will the 
Assembly could not secure with honest dealing and respect for land rights, the 
Quaker legislators were more than willing to pay for. Given the relatively poor 
financial status of the proprietors, the Quaker-dominated Assembly spent 
lavishly in the cause of maintaining peaceful relations with its Indian neighbors. 
Consequently, the Assembly reasoned that bearing the cost entitled the 
legislature to an active role in directing Indian treaties and conferences.67 Penn 
wished to limit the Assembly’s involvement with the management o f Indian 
affairs to financial support.
In 1748, Thomas Penn appointed James Hamilton as the first in a 
succession of deputy governors through whom he hoped to reclaim his rightful 
measure of authority. The Assembly initially approved of Hamilton, who was 
the only native Pennsylvanian to serve as governor during the colonial period. 
However, in July 1751, Penn launched his first strike at the source of the 
Assembly’s financial independence. He secretly directed Hamilton to refuse his
66 Ibid., 6-7,41; Hutson, Pennsylvania Politics. 10.
67 Hanna, Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics. 6; W ilbur R. Jacobs, 
Diplomacy and Indian Gifts: Anglo-French Rivalry Along the Ohio and 
Northwestern Frontiers. 1748-1763 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1950), 
18; Albert T. Volwiler, George Croghan and the W estward Movement. 1741- 
1782 (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1926), 56.
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assent to excise bills that did not allow the governor joint control over 
expenditures. Hamilton warned Penn to no avail that the Assembly would 
"bounce violently, and be very angry." Penn’s directive touched off a 
prolonged conflict. The Assembly’s antagonism toward proprietary instructions 
and Penn’s insistence on predetermining the actions of his governors would be 
at the center of most of Pennsylvania’s political disputes for the next decade.68
Hamilton dutifully adhered to Penn’s instructions as relations with the 
Assembly grew more strained. In late 1753, after considerable wrangling, the 
Assembly was under the impression that the governor was close to approving a 
paper money bill. In an unexpected turnabout, Hamilton refused the bill in a 
m anner taken by the Assembly as a consummate example of proprietary bad 
faith. Although desperate to find a means of justifying his veto, the governor 
regarded revealing the contents o f the proprietor’s instructions as politically
68 Hutson, Pennsylvania Politics. 7-13; Sister Joan De Lourdes Leonard, The 
Organization and Procedure of the Pennsylvania Assembly. 1682-1776 
(Philadelphia, 1949), 58. In their respective studies o f mid-eighteenth-century 
Pennsylvnia politics, Hutson and Hanna offer disparate views of the conflict 
between the Assembly and the proprietor. Hutson’s treatment is highly critical 
of Thomas Penn’s handling of political affairs in the province. Hutson argues 
that Penn’s often unfounded suspicions about the Assembly and his covert 
methods added unnecessary rancor to Pennsylvania politics. For Hutson, the 
Assembly reflected the will of the colony’s citizens. Hanna sees at least the 
early stages of the conflict as a dispute between rival groups of elite politicians 
each motivated by self preservation. Hanna is far more sympathetic toward 
Thomas Penn and casts him in the role of a well-meaning reform er, see Hanna, 
Beniamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics. 17,52. For a refutation of 
H anna’s w ork see Hutson "Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics, 1751- 
1755: A Reappraisal." Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 
[hereafter PM HB], XCIII, no. 3 (1969), 303-371.
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unwise. Instead, he forestalled the bill by citing a long-ignored royal 
instruction of 1740. Hamilton declared that the instruction required him to 
withold his approval unless a suspending clause was attached to the bill. The 
Assembly was outraged. Before his insistence on the suspending clause, the 
populace had been willing to disassociate Hamilton from the machinations of 
the proprietor. Most chose to regard the governor as reluctantly but loyally 
bound by the instructions of his superior in London. No longer. Ham ilton’s 
popularity in the colony declined rapidly.69
French encroachments in the west and the rumor of growing disaffection 
by the Ohio Indians intensified the governor’s ongoing struggle with the 
legislature. The pacifist majority in the Assembly dismissed Hamilton’s 
frequent calls to action and displayed a reluctance to provide military funds to 
defend the frontier.70 Exhausted by nearly two years o f continuous antagonism, 
Hamilton repeatedly asked Penn to accept his resignation. Penn relented but 
was convinced that in the Assembly’s eyes the governor’s withdrawal would 
"look like throwing up a commission in the day of battle."71
In waging his campaign against the Assembly, Penn’s attempts to
69 Hutson "Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics," 328; W infred Trexler 
Root, The Relations of Pennsylvania with the British Government. 1696-1765 
(New York: University of Pennsylvania, 1912), 198-99.
70 Robert L .D . Davidson, W ar Comes to Quaker Pennsylvania. 1682-1756 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), 106-12.
71 Quoted in Nicholas Wainwright George Croghan. W ilderness Diplomat 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 69-70.
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organize a cohesive proprietary party had been unsuccessful. Pennsylvania’s 
citizens regarded the proprietary interest as exceedingly narrow and tended to 
view the Assembly as representing "the whole people."72 In the mid-1750s, 
Penn’s supporters were mostly wealthy, self-interested men whose political 
activity extended only to accepting executive appointments and other patronage. 
Many of Pennsylvania’s non-Quaker elites regarded partisan politics as 
unseemly. Between 1754 and 1764, only two of the thirty-six members of the 
Assembly were avowed proprietary supporters. In the troubled latter stages of 
his governorship, Hamilton found that many men in the proprietary ranks 
declined his appointments for fear of becoming politically tainted by the 
association.73 In England, Thomas Penn found it equally difficult to fill the 
highest positions in Pennsylvania’s government. "Men of the first rank did not 
seek the Governorship," William S. Hanna argued "because the pay was not 
large and the difficulties with the Assembly had given it a bad reputation in 
England. "74
In May 1754, Penn met with Robert Hunter M orris in London and 
appointed him deputy governor of Pennsylvania. Morris posted a performance
72 Allen Tully, William Penn’s Legacy: Politics and Social Structure in 
Provincial Pennsylvania. 1726-1755. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1977), 94.
73 Hanna, Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics. 18-20,45; G.B. W arden 
"The Proprietary Group in Pennsylvania, 1754-1764" W illiam and M arv
Q uarterly. Third Series, XXI, 3 (July 1964), 383.
74 Hanna, Beniamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics. 19-20.
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bond of five thousand pounds which Penn required of his deputy governors to 
insure their adherence to his instructions. M orris was promised an annual 
income of fifteen hundred pounds. Two-thirds of M orris’s pay would have to 
be obtained from the Assembly, which had a history of witholding salaries as a 
means of wringing legislative approval from stubborn governors. Penn also 
insisted that M orris provide twelve months’ notice of his resignation.75
In M orris, Penn had found a seasoned and strong-willed if shrill 
combatant who could be counted on to take the political offensive against the 
Assembly. Yet, beyond Penn’s desire to place a strong advocate of the 
proprietary interest at the head of the government, a punitive undercurrent ran 
beneath the appointment. Historian Francis Jennings concluded that Penn was 
in the process of waging a "personal war" against the Assembly, with the 
prim ary objective of discrediting the Quaker elite.76 Morris was a prominent 
mem ber of the East Jersey proprietors, a group that had displayed little 
tolerance toward Quakers.77
Penn’s desire to contain the Assembly’s influence outweighed whatever
75 Articles o f Agreement, Robert Hunter Morris Papers, Volume I, 55. New 
Jersey Historical Society; Shepherd, History of Proprietary Government in 
Pennsylvania. 455-456.
76 Francis Jennings, Empire o f Fortune: Crowns. Colonies, and Tribes in the 
Seven Years W ar in America (New York: Norton, 1988), 141-142.
77 Kemmerer, Path to Freedom . 164. As governor of New Jersey, Lewis M orris 
had opposed the Quakers on fiscal and military matters and sought to 
disenfranchise members of the sect.
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concern he felt for the stability o f the already deadlocked provincial 
government. W hen Penn contemplated his new deputy’s likely impact on 
Pennsylvania, he must have considered the often violent reactions that M orris’s 
defense of proprietary prerogative had provoked in New Jersey and the 
contempt which many in the legislature felt toward him. In Pennsylvania, 
M orris would be confronted with an already heated dispute and a far more 
powerful legislature. In the past, disparate factions of provincial and imperial 
officials had at different times worked to manuever both Morris and his father 
away from the similarly charged atmosphere of New York politics in the 
interest o f diffusing potential upheavals.
Pennsylvanians were well aware of M orris’s reputation in New Jersey. 
There were few provincial politicians more roundly disliked. Richard Hockley, 
one of Penn’s agents in Philadelphia, candidly assessed the public attitude 
toward M orris’s impending arrival. "Some call him a Tyrant," Hockley bluntly 
told Penn, "others say you might as well have sent the Devil and have in this 
Instance, shew’d your great regard for the Province, the most modest say ’tis 
the most unfortunate thing that has happen’d to Pensilvania, and he shall sitt in 
hott W ater if he shews his Jersey airs."78
M orris clearly relished the challenge of taking on the Pennsylvania 
Assembly. Benjamin Franlin unexpectedly met the new governor in New York
78 Quoted in Mabel Pauline W olff The Colonial Agency of Pennsylvania. 1712- 
1757 (Philadelphia, 1933), 157.
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as the latter was en route from London to Philadelphia. The two had long been 
acquainted and were on friendly term s.79 W hen asked, Franklin advised M orris 
that he might avoid having an "uncomfortable" administration by keeping clear 
of quarrels with the Assembly. Morris coyly protested that "Disputing" was 
one of his "greatest pleasures," but that on consideration of Franklin’s advice 
he would avoid such situations "if possible."80
On October 3, 1754, M orris arrived in Philadelphia. By training if not 
by temperament, he was prepared to undertake the routine administrative and 
political responsibilties of his office. Despite the obligatory pleasantries and 
assurances of good will from both the new governor and Speaker Isaac Norris, 
the battle over proprietary rights was quickly renewed.81 Had the crisis 
brewing on the Ohio not erupted and spread eastward during his tenure,
M orris’s term in office might "only" have been notable as a more strident 
continuation of Hamilton’s struggle with the Assembly.82
79 M orris had been a corresponding member o f the American Philosophical 
Society since 1744 and despite their political differences the two men apparently 
enjoyed each other’s company in social settings. See Davidson, W ar Comes To 
Quaker Pennsylvania. 126; Franklin, Autobiography. 167-68.
80 Ibid.. 166-67.
81 Colonial Records: Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania 
[hereafter cited as PCR] (Harrisburg: Theo. Fenn & Co., 1851), Volume
VI, 166-68 ; Hanna, Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics. 59.
82 Hutson, Pennsylvania Politics. 14.
II. Pennsylvania Indian Affairs Before 1754.
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William Penn believed that the Quaker ideal of universal brotherhood 
should guide the colony’s dealings with the Indians. Before sailing for 
America, he had resolved to win the Indians’ friendship as well as their land. 
Penn was not bound to recognize native land rights under the charter granted 
Pennsylvania by King Charles II. Nonetheless, the proprietor acknowledged 
the Delawares’ ownership of the territory he planned to open for settlement. 
Under Penn’s direction, land purchases required Indian consent. Settlement 
would be permitted only on land to which the proprietors had established clear 
title.83 In the eighteenth century, Pennsylvania’s Indian relations were defined 
by trade and the acquisition of land. William Penn’s legacy of good will eased 
the friction between Pennsylvania’s whites and Indians well enough to allow the 
colony to expand peacefully in both wealth and size.84
While William Penn’s benevolent intentions provided the impetus for the
83 Isaac Sharpless, A History of Quaker Government in
Pennsylvania.(Philadelphia: T.S. Leach, 1900), I, 156-57; Shepherd, History of 
Proprietary Government in Pennsylvania.96: C .A . W eslager, The Delaware 
Indians: A History. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1972), 156-58.
84 During Penn’s years in the new colony Indian relations were seldom as 
cohesive as has traditionally been portrayed. However, Gary B. Nash wrote that 
Indians relations "were far less abrasive than in other colonies." Gary B. Nash, 
Quakers and Politics: Pennsylvania. 1681-1726 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1968), 87. See also Shepherd, Proprietary Government in Pennsylvania. 
95-96 and W eslager, The Delaware Indians. 169-70 for discussions o f the often 
overstated amity between whites and Indians in early Pennsylvania.
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colony’s expansion, the more assertive James Logan, the colony’s provincial 
secretary, largely formulated Pennsylvania’s Indian policy.85 Logan was a loyal 
protege of the proprietor but, as Francis Jennings wrote, "he did not share 
Penn’s scruples" in his dealings with the Indians.86 Logan amassed a 
considerable fortune from the Indian trade. From 1701 until his retirement 
from public affairs in 1747, he headed the proprietary Commissioners of 
Property through which he directed and oversaw the purchase of land from the 
Delawares. Although the administration of Indian affairs was the duty of the 
governor, most who held the office deferred to Logan’s influence and 
expertise.87 Logan’s domination of Pennsylvania’s Indian trade provided him 
with the means to benefit directly from proprietary land purchases.
Speculation in proprietary land proved to be even more lucrative than trade. 
Logan secured the lands of the eastern Delawares through aggressive and often 
dishonest tactics.88
The growth of Pennsylvania’s economy relied in large measure on the 
Indian trade. Peltry provided Pennsylvania with much needed capital from
85 Julian P. Boyd, ed. Indian Treaties Printed by Benjamin Franklin. 1736-1762 
(Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1938), xix; Charles P. Keith 
Chronicles of Pennsylvania from the English Revolution to the Peace of Aix-la- 
Chapelle. 1688-1748 (Philadelphia: Patterson & White, 1917), II, 708-709.
86 Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire (New York: Norton,
1984), 248.
87 Ibid., 248.
88 Ibid., 267, 271-72.
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Europe. By 1710 Indians as far west as the Susquehanna were largely 
dependent on English trade goods. The success of Pennsylvania’s trade 
depended on a productive body of hunting Indians whose presence in turn posed 
an impediment to white settlement. Indian groups were thus drawn to the 
Susquehanna by trade only to be driven further west by advancing settlem ent.89
By the early eighteenth century, the Six Nations of New York had 
claimed the Susquehanna Valley and established control over its native 
inhabitants. The nature of Iroquois dominance over Pennsylvania’s Indians, 
especially the means by which the Six Nations subjugated the Delawares, has 
been subject to different interpretations. The traditional view holds that the 
Iroquois had subdued the Delawares by conquest or intimidation and forced 
them to assume the powerless and humiliating role of "women" in the Covenant 
Chain.90 Francis Jennings found the meaning of the Delawares’ role as 
"women" to be more subtle and varied. He argued that the Iroquois-Delaware 
relationship was not one of simple dominance and that the female assignation 
was in fact a "misleading m etaphor." Jennings argued that the Iroquois conquest 
o f the Delawares was a "myth" and he interpreted their status as "women" as a
89 Francis Jennings "Miquon’s Passing: Indian-European Relations in Colonial 
Pennsylvania, 1674-1755" (Ph.D. diss., University o f Pennsylvania, 1965), 5-8; 
Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Em pire. 267.
90 See Thayer, A History of Quaker Government in Pennsylvania. 174-175; C. 
Hale Sipe, The Indian W ars of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg: Telegraph Press, 
1931), 41-42; W eslager, The Delaware Indians. 181.
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functional rather than hierarchical role.91
Beginning in the late seventeenth century and continuing into the middle 
of the eighteenth, large numbers of Indians sought refuge in Pennsylvania from 
war and white encroachment. Most settled near the Susquehanna. Several 
groups o f Shawnees from the west and south emigrated to different parts of 
Pennsylvania. O f the two largest Shawnee contingents, one settled along the 
Susquehanna near the Conestoga Indians and the other in the W yoming Vallley. 
For nearly a century, successive bands of Tuscaroras settled in Pennsylvania as 
part o f their larger migration from North Carolina to New York. Some of the 
Tuscaroras remained in the Juniata Valley until the outbreak of war in 1755. 
Smaller Indian groups who came to the province included Tutelos from the 
Virginia piedmont, Nanticokes from eastern Maryland, the Piscataway from 
western M aryland, and the Twightwees from Virginia and North Carolina.92
By the 1720s, the Delawares and Shawnees were growing restive under 
the relentless advance of white settlers. The fertile Tulpehocken Valley, 
located on the upper reaches of the Schuylkill River, had become a haven for 
the displaced Delawares from the east and the newly arrived Shawnees. In 
1723, Tulpehocken had yet to be purchased by the proprietors when Palatine 
German settlers moved into the valley and began clearing the land. Some
91 Jennings, "Miquon’s Passing," 18-20.
92 Sipe, The Indian W ars of Pennsylvania. 45-58; W eslager, The Delaware 
Indians. 182.
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Indians grudgingly set out for the Susquehanna and the Ohio, but not before 
they had made their resentment known to Pennsylvania’s government. In 1732, 
the Delaware chief Sassoonan, aging and consumed by alcohol, was finally 
pressured by proprietary agents into granting a deed for the Tulpehocken land. 
On the upper Delaware River, Indians were also being displaced, often 
violently, by Scots-Irish settlers who bore little regard for Quaker scruples.93 
Increasingly, land purchases followed white settlement rather than initiating it 
as the first proprietor had envisioned. Logan faced a serious dilemma. He 
was acutely aware that Pennsylvania could not count on the quiescence of the 
Delawares and Shawnees indefinitely. Land-hungry Germans and Scots-Irish 
were arriving in ever-increasing numbers. The Quaker Assembly would 
withhold its support from any military venture and there was clearly trouble on 
the frontier. Fortunately for Logan and Pennsylvania, the Six Nations at the 
same time were strengthening their hold on the Indians along the Susquehanna. 
In the late 1720s, the Iroquois sent the Oneida chief, Shickelamy, to the 
Susquehanna to act as viceroy over the client tribes. Shickelamy established his 
base at Shamokin, an Indian town strategically located at the juncture of the 
east and west branches of the Susquehanna R iver.94
James Logan worked to establish a strong alliance with the Iroquois and
93 Paul A. W. Wallace Conrad W eiser. Freind of Colonist and Mohawk 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945), 41-44; W eslager, The 
Delaware Indians. 184-85.
94 W allace, Conrad W eiser. 44; Sipe, The Indian W ars of Pennsylvania. 45.
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to encourage their dominance over Pennsylvania’s Indians.95 As Thomas Penn 
expressed it, the intent of Pennsylvania’s new Indian policy was to enable the 
Six Nations "to be better answerable for their Tributaries."96 Francis Jennings 
has argued that Logan "permitted himself to believe that Pennsylvania’s native 
Indians could be dispensed with if only the Iroquois could be kept in the 
province’s interest."97 Increasing tensions with New York and with the French 
in the west made the alliance attractive to the Six Nations as well. The 
Iroquois desired English recognition of their claim to the Susquehanna and 
acknowledgement of their preeminence over all of the northern tribes.98
With the formation of the Iroquois alliance, Conrad W eiser emerged as 
Pennsylvania’s chief operative in Indian affairs. W eiser was of German birth 
and an adopted Mohawk. He had developed close ties with the Great Council 
at Onondaga before settling in Pennsylvania. Although styled simply the 
provincial interpreter, W eiser embodied Pennsylvania’s "new Indian policy."99 
Paul A .W . Wallace wrote that the Six Nations regarded W eiser as "their
95 Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties Printed by Beniamin Franklin, xx.
96 Quoted in Wallace, Conrad W eiser. 44.
97 Jennings, "Miquon’s Passing," 379.
98 Ibid., 392.
99 Carl W eslager in The Delaware Indians. 172-95 and W allace in Conrad 
W eiser. 39-49, both entitled chapters with the term "new Indian policy" in 
discussing the Pennsylvania- Iroquois alliance.
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m an."100
In 1742, Pennsylvania and the Six Nations conspired to strip the 
Delawares of their land rights in Pennsylvania and to remove them from the 
forks of the Delaware R iver.101 According to Jennings, the signing of the 
Treaty of Lancaster of 1744 marked the zenith of the Six Nations’ power. 
However, the Six Nations’ more aggressive policy toward their tributary tribes 
ultimately began to undercut their strength.102 By the early 1730s, Delawares 
and Shawnees had begun to settle in the Ohio Valley. Iroquois people moved 
there as well. The Six Nations’ control over the Ohio Indians began to lessen 
as the French began moving down the river in the 1740s.103
By the 1750s, the "Long Peace" was on the verge of collapse. Since the 
founding of Pennsylvania over seventy years earlier, peace had been maintained 
between Pennsylvania and its neighboring Indians. However, Pennsylvania’s 
governors had long been guilty of a perfunctory regard for the colony’s Indian 
affairs while the Assembly had chosen to ignore the implications of the growing 
French presence on the frontier.
Three months before Robert Hunter Morris arrived in Philadelphia, 
George W ashington and a group of militiamen had been forced by the French
100 Ibid., 46
101 Jennings, "Miquon’s Passing," 387.
102 Ibid., 392.
103 W eslager, The Delaware Indians. 205-206.
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to surrender Fort Necessity and leave the Ohio country. A contingent of 
Delawares, Shawnees, and Mingoes --supposed friends of the English— were 
among the most eager participants in the French capture of W ashington’s force. 
After the engagement, the Indians destroyed the livestock and carried off the 
supplies of W ashington’s defeated garrison. Ironically, the English traders with 
W ashington’s party knew many of the Indians by nam e.104 M orris had 
anticipated the challenge of advancing the proprietary interest against the 
Assembly. But as he entered the governorship, he faced the even more 
daunting task of retaining the loyalty of those Delawares not already turned by 
the French seizure of the Ohio.
104 Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the American 
Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), VI, 41.
CHAPTER III
ROBERT HUNTER MORRIS AND THE POLITICS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
THROUGH BRADDOCK’S DEFEAT
Recent scholars of the Seven Years W ar in Pennsylvania have recognized 
that the Delawares and Shawnees had ample and longstanding reasons for 
attacking the colony’s frontier in 1755 and 1756. Francis Jennings wrote that 
the Delaware war against Pennsylvania "had been in the making, gradually 
acquiring force and implacability, for decades."105 Similarly, Carl W eslager 
traced the alienation of the Delawares to James Logan’s redirection of 
Pennsylvania’s Indian policy toward the Six Nations.106
The Indians had more than vengeful bloodletting in mind when they 
struck the Pennsylvanians. Stephen F. Auth argued that the Delawares, no less 
than the French and English, fought for their own interests and pursued their 
own strategy. However, the Delawares possessed a narrower range of options 
owing to the shifting fortunes of the more powerful French, British, and 
Iroquois. Auth showed that earlier scholars dismissed the existence of Indian 
motives behind Pennsylvania’s frontier wars in the 1750s and portrayed the
105 Francis Jennings, "The Delaware Interregnum," PM HB. LXXXIX (1965), 
174.
106 W eslager, The Delaware Indians. 193.
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natives as easily manipulated by whites. According to Auth, historians Francis 
Parkman, George Bancroft, Lawrence Henry Gibson, and A .F .C . Wallace 
agreed in effect that "the Indians’ attitudes were irrelevant to the conflict."107 
Auth argued that a "historical consensus has emerged from the belief that 
Indians were peculiarly irrational creatures incapable of long-range calculation 
and planning."108
In 1940, Randall C. Downes sought to explain the causes of 
Pennsylvania’s frontier war in his study of Indian affairs on the upper Ohio.
His conception of the Indian psyche illustrates the simplistic characterizations 
that Jennings and Auth have attempted to correct. Downes believed that the 
eighteeenth-century French historian Michel Pouchot possessed a "rare 
understanding" of the process that drove the Indians to war. "The Indian," 
Pouchot had written, "abuses himself because he feels too much." Unable to 
suppress their violent urges, the Indians abandoned their own interests and 
allowed themselves to be used as "instruments of hatred" by the French and 
English. Drawing upon Pouchot, Downes concluded that once they had worked 
the initially reticent Indians past the brink of rage, the French "could not have 
stopped the murderous warfare of 1755-1757 even if they had wished to ."109
107 Stephen F. Auth, The Ten Years War: Indian-White Relations in 
Pennsylvania. 1755-1756 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989), 1-4,8.
108 Ibid., 7.
109 Randall C. Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio: A Narrative of 
Indian Affairs in the Upper Ohio until 1795 (Pittsburgh: University of
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Jennings and Auth would agree that the French had minimal control over the 
Indian war parties, but for a markedly different reason. The Delawares and 
their primary allies, the Shawnees, fought not for the French, but to preserve 
their own lands from white settlement.110
Robert Hunter M orris regarded the Susquehanna Delawares as slavish 
and unwieldy subjects best left to the immediate supervision of the Six Nations. 
He judged the Susquehanna tributary tribes to be in a state of "Subjection and 
Dependency upon the Six Nations." W hen the Delawares’ assault on the 
frontier suggested otherwise, he argued that they had "sold themselves" to the 
French, whom he described as their "New M asters."111 M orris’s understanding 
of the frontier war was based on his belief that the Delawares and Shawnees 
were little more than capricious mercenaries. "Indians are of a martial Spirit," 
M orris later explained to the Assembly "and in such a Season as this must be in 
A ction."112
W hen M orris became governor, he saw the threat of hostilities emanating 
solely from French operations on the Ohio. A convincing display of 
Pennsylvania’s willingness to fight and resist the French was the only way to
Pittsburgh Press, 1940), 79-81.
110 Auth, The Ten Years’ W ar. 9; Jennings, "Miquon’s Passing," 448.
111 M orris to Scarroyady and Andrew Montour, April 8, 1756, Pennsylvania 
Archives: The Papers of the Governors. 4th ser., (Harrisburg: The State of 
Pennsylvania, 1900) [hereafter cited as PA, 4th ser.], 2:590.
112 M orris to the Assembly, November 10, 1755, PA, 4th ser., 2:522.
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retain the loyalty of the Ohio Indians. However, Morris faced slim prospects 
for arming the frontier. Bound by the proprietor’s instructions, M orris’s 
predecessor, Governor James Hamilton, had refused to the last to accept funds 
for the defense of the province on the Assembly’s term s.113
In an informal meeting on October 15, 1754, M orris confronted the 
Assembly for the first time. He summoned the legislators to the Council 
Chamber and in the king’s name urged them to "exert" themselves in the 
defense of Pennsylvania. M orris laid no specific proposal before his audience. 
Instead, he emphasized the "avowed Resolution" of the French "to make 
themselves Masters of this Country" and the possibility o f "open W ar." Morris 
set the ongoing power struggle between proprietor and legislature aside. By 
inference, he sought to make the Assembly’s resistance to the proprietor’s will 
and their steadfast pacifism appear dangerously short-sighted. He did not try to 
shake their political and religious convictions, but appealed to their identity as 
Englishmen and the rights which British citizenship afforded them. M orris 
attempted to persuade them that allowing a French victory in North America 
was a far greater betrayal of Quaker principles than casting votes in favor of 
military defense. "I am sure I need only mention to You the arbitrary and 
tyrannical Nature of their Government," M orris suggested, "and the detestable
113 Hamilton to the Assembly, August 16, 1754, Colonial Records: Minutes of 
the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania. 16 vols. (Harrisburg: Theo. Fenn & 
C o., 1851) [herafter cited as CR], 6:139-40.
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Principles of their Religion to convince You of the unhappy Condition these 
Colonies will be reduced to should they ever become subject to the F rench ."114
M orris was aware that many of the Ohio Delawares and Shawnees had 
established ties with the French after W ashington’s surrender at Fort Necessity. 
He made only a single reference to the role the Indians might play in a war 
with France. He warned the legislators that the French "may not only annoy us 
by the Indians in their alliance, but can at any time march a Body of Troops 
into this plentiful Province."115 Behind every Indian word and deed hostile to 
Pennsylvania, M orris saw the hand of the French who used "every Artifice to 
corrupt & alienate them from our Interest."116
W hen Morris first arrived in Philadelphia, the French had already 
established an imposing presence on the Ohio. Some Indians had joined the 
French, while others fled the new European sphere of influence. The 
overwhelming majority of the Ohio Indians were now free of Iroquois 
supervision and could deal openly with the French. Tanacharison and 
Scarroyady, Iroquois vice-regents of the Ohio tributary tribes, led over two 
hundred "loyal" Indians eastward.117 These Iroquois chiefs settled their large 
band at Aughwick, an isolated frontier trading plantation belonging to George
114 M orris to the Assembly, October 15, 1754, CR 6:166-67.
115 Ibid.. 166.
116 M orris to the Assembly, November 10, 1755, PA, 4th ser., 2:522.
117 Jennings, "Miquon’s Passing," 449.
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Croghan. By the autumn of 1754, Aughwick was crowded with both Indians 
and English traders who had been driven from the O hio.118 W ith the presence 
of the Iroquois leaders, Croghan’s plantation now sheltered a government in 
exile for the Ohio axis of the Pennsylvania-Six Nations alliance. The Indians at 
Aughwick were housed in cabins scattered over a radius of a few miles and 
were relatively well fed from Croghan’s corn fields and vegetable patches. 
However, dysentery and a steady supply of liquor smuggled into the camp took 
their toll on the refugees.119
In the waning days of his governorship, James Hamilton sent Conrad 
W eiser to Aughwick with orders to report on the "Dispositions and future 
Intentions" o f the two Iroquois chiefs and the Ohio tribesmen "respecting the 
Hostilities o f the French ."120 W eiser learned that the Senecas, an Iroquois tribe 
with ties to both the French and English, had ordered the Ohio Indians to 
remain neutral until further instructions arrived from the Six Nations. On the 
other hand, the Mohawks, Oneidas, and Tuscaroras had declared their 
willingness to fight the French provided they were joined by the English.
W eiser observed not only a growing division among the Six Nations, but also 
signs that Iroquois control over the tributaries had begun to wane. The 
Delawares and Shawnees had formed a close alliance and both were being
118 W ainwright, George Croghan. 75.
119 W eiser to Hamilton, September 13, 1754, CR 6:149.
120 Ham ilton’s instructions to W eiser, August 24, 1754, CR 6:147.
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courted by the French on the Ohio. At W inchester the year before, the 
Delaware chief Beaver had openly violated Iroquois diplomatic protocol when 
he bypassed the Six Nations and spoke directly to the English on behalf of the 
Shawnees. Beaver continued the defiant practice at Aughwick. Scarroyady, an 
Oneida chief, was the Iroquois supervisor of the Ohio Shawnees. At Aughwick 
he was visibly angered when he discovered that his charges had failed to 
consult him when approached by a Twightwee war party eager to fight the 
French. The Shawnees had rejected the overtures o f the Twightwees and 
refused to jo in  them. The Twightwee band then left in frustration.121
The proprietary authorities contemplated the wisdom of continuing to 
acknowledge the supremacy of the Iroquois on the Ohio. The allegiance of the 
Ohio Delawares and Shawnees might ultimately prove more valuable than that 
of the Six Nations in the defense of Pennsylvania. Conrad W eiser reported to 
Governor Hamilton that the western tributaries had developed a sense of their 
own strength and were eager to throw off the control o f the Six Nations. 
"Betwixt them two separate Interests," Hamilton wrote to Thomas Penn, "it is 
really difficult to know how to act without offending one of them ." The 
proprietary government chose the existing alliance with the Iroquois. "The rise 
and fall of the two Interests must therefore be carefully attended to," Hamilton 
concluded, "but at present I think it safest to treat through the Council at
121 CR 6:149, 159; Jennings, Empire of Fortune. 75; Jennings, "M iquon’s 
Passing," 449.
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Onondago."122 By the time the government responded to the messages W eiser 
carried from Aughwick, the office of governor had changed hands.
Robert Hunter Morris probably had little experience with the symbolic 
protocol and metaphorical speech of Indian diplomacy. As governor he 
assumed the title of "Brother Onas," the name that Pennsylvania’s Indians had 
bestowed upon William Penn and continued to call his successors.123 Conrad 
W eiser wrote the draft of M orris’s first message to Aughwick and as provincial 
interpreter probably shaped many others to conform to Delaware and Iroquois 
parlance.124 In the realm of provincial politics, M orris was a tireless and 
provocative speaker and writer. His contentious messages to the Assembly 
were long-winded and meticulously argued. W hen attacked by the Assembly, 
M orris allowed not even the slightest perceived affront to go unansw ered.125
122 "Extract o f a Letter from the Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania to M r. 
Penn" [dated 1754], Penn Manuscripts, Indian Affairs 1754-1756, II, 20, 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
123 James H. Merrell The Indians’ New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors 
from European Contact through the Era of Removal (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1989), 148; Weslager, A History of the Delaware 
Indians. 166. The Algonquian-speaking Delawares had initially addressed 
W illiam Penn as "Miquon," meaning "quill" which the English used as "pens." 
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Indian groups treating with the Pennsylvania government.
124 Pennsylvania Archives. 1st ser. (Philadelphia: Joseph Severns & Co., 1853) 
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Consequently, he had little patience with the far more restrained manner of 
Indian diplomatic ritual. ’’The Indians adhere so closely to their Tedious 
Cermonies," M orris once wrote to William Johnson, "that I am sensible you 
must have had a most fatiguing time of it."126 Colonial authorities had long 
resigned themselves to the Indian manner of diplomatic discourse, but their 
intentions and sense of superiority were never compromised. "The hearty 
handshakes, the friendly words, and the piles of presents," James H. M errell 
observed, "concealed contempt and a manipulative, even exploitative 
instinct."127 M orris’s correspondence and meetings with the Indians, especially 
the tributary tribes, exemplified M errell’s generalization.
Governor M orris had been in Philadelphia for nearly two months when 
he made his official presence known to the Aughwick Indians. The French 
were gaining support among the western Iroquois. A "great many" Iroquois 
had gone to Canada with neither "fear nor regard" of the pro-English 
commissioners who had tried to stop them. Daniel Claus reported that it would
that did not the duties of my Station and Justice to the people require me to take 
some notice of it, I should think it beneath me as a Gentleman to make any 
reply." After a withering item-by-item refutation of the Assembly’s remarks, he 
told them that over the last "fifteen years" they were guilty of "more artifice, 
more time and money spent in frivolous controversies, more unparallelled 
abuses of your Governors, and more undutifullness to the Crown, than in all 
the rest of his M ajestie’s Colonies put together." Morris to Assembly,
September 24, 1755, CR 6:617-23.
126 M orris to William Johnson, April 24, 1756, Papers of Sir W illiam Johnson. 
II, 439.
127 M errell, The Indians’ New W orld. 150.
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take a very long letter to document "all the false and unjust stories the French 
spread among the Six Nations about W ashington’s defeat." Claus argued that 
only an English show of strength could counter the effects of French 
propaganda among the Indians.128
W ith neither a militia at his disposal nor the prospect of military 
expenditures from the Assembly, M orris could offer little more than words to 
the Indians at Aughwick. In his letter, M orris addressed the Iroquois 
supervisors to whom he made the virtually meaningless pronouncement that 
they were now under the "protection" of Pennsylvania. The Indians were told 
that the king of England had been moved to action "upon hearing o f the 
invasion of the French on your lands." After exhausting "all fair means" the 
king had resolved to drive the French from the Ohio, protect the Indians, and 
"more too if they desire it of him in a suitable way." After making these 
grandiose promises, M orris told the Indians that the British campaign against 
the French was likely to be directed by the governor of M aryland and that they 
had best wait to hear "the particulars" from him .129
The Indians ignored M orris’s disclaimer. "The Ohio Indians in 
Ginrele," Croghan scrawled back to the governor, "putts thire hole Dependence 
on [Pennsylvania’s] government in Regarde to ye Expedition." The Indians
128 Claus to "the late Governor," October 1754, CR 6:181-82.
129 M orris to the Indians at Aughwick, November 15, 1754, PA, 1st ser.,
2:193; Croghan to M orris, December 2, 1754, Ibid.. 209.
53
would go to war only in concert with the English and they expected to be 
supported until such time as their white allies decided to fight. M oreover, if 
M orris and the Assembly could not quickly provide the Indians with ample food 
and clothing, Croghan thought it better to "give them up without any further 
Expence."130 The Assembly complained of the cost, but nonetheless kept 
Aughwick supplied with provisions through the w inter.131
M orris again consulted Conrad W eiser before sending a message of 
greeting to the the Ohio and Susquehanna Delawares. In July 1754, a 
proprietary delegation aided by W eiser had persuaded the Iroquois at Albany to 
sell a huge tract of land extending from the Alleghanies to the Ohio. The 
Albany purchase was a final blow to the prestige of the Delawares and they 
greeted W eiser’s report of the sale with disgust.132 The Six Nations had 
reserved the towns of Wyoming and Shamokin "and the land contiguous on 
Susquehannah" for those Indians who chose to "remove from the F rench ."133 
Careful neither to tread on Iroquois authority nor to agitate the Delawares, the 
governor spoke of the situation in the west in pleasant generalities. He invoked 
the memory of W illiam Penn as he reconfirmed the longstanding "Treaty of
130 Croghan to M orris, December 2, 1754, CR 6:211.
131 Assembly to M orris, April 4, 1755, Pennsylvania Archives: Votes o f the 
Assembly. 8th ser., (Philadelphia: Joseph Severns and Company, 1931) 
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132 Auth, The Ten Y ears’ W ar. 24.
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Friendship" with the Delawares. He genially glossed over three decades of 
proprietary exploitation and white encroachment when he insisted that 
Pennsylvania’s whites and the Delawares were one people "notwithstanding you 
now live at a great distance from us." M orris also made a patronizing attempt 
to ameliorate the Albany purchase. "We look upon the place you now live," he 
told the Delawares, "as a place of Sport and good Hunting; this never makes 
any odds between B retheren."134 M orris had obviously noted that the Iroquois 
had reserved land for their own hunting in the Albany deed. The Indians 
hardly intended the territory for "sport."
Most English colonists interpreted the Indian m ale’s proclivity for 
hunting as evidence of an idle and frivolous nature. The English looked 
askance at the Indian division of labor which made agriculture the exclusive 
province of women. Despite its importance to Indian life, the English could not 
accept the idea of hunting as "real w ork ."135 In essence, M orris was telling the 
Delawares that as long as Pennsylvania’s government left them with their 
diversions and the bare means of survival, the Indians need not worry over the 
loss of their land. M orris came to rely heavily on Scarroyady, an Oneida 
sachem, as his chief operative among the tributary tribes. The governor 
praised Scarroyady as "a M an who is so sensible that the Cause of the Indians
134 M orris to the Delawares, December 3, 1754, CR 6:187.
135 James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Contest o f Cultures in Colonial 
North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 157-58.
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and the English is one and the sam e."136 Scarroyady was committed to 
maintaining the Pennsylvania-Iroquois alliance which was crucial to the Six 
Nations’ (as well as his own) preeminence over the Delawares and Shawnees.137 
His position at Onondaga had no doubt declined after his flight from the Ohio. 
He now sought to preserve his place in Indian affairs at the opposite end of the 
covenant chain in Philadelphia.
Scarroyady displayed both an unsettling candor as well as a high degree 
o f loyalty in his service to the proprietary leaders. At a conference in late 
M arch 1755, he concluded his "publick Business" with the governor and 
council and then offered them some advice. "You think You perfectly well 
understand the Management of Indian Affairs," he told them, "but I must tell 
you that it is not so, and that the French are more politick than you."
Scarroyady then criticized the Pennsylvania government for being less generous 
than the French in issuing presents and warned of the consequences.138 The 
outnumbered French recognized that their success on the Ohio depended upon 
Indian support. A unified Indian policy further strengthened the French 
presence, by contrast to English North America where each colony supervised
136 M orris to Scarroyady, December 14, 1754, PA, 4th ser., 2:315.
137 Council Minutes, April 16, 1755, CR 6:364.
138 Scarroyady to the Provincial Council, M arch 31, 1755, CR 6:344. Perhaps 
in a diplomatic attempt to diffuse his criticism, Scarroyady included the 
governments of Maryland and Virginia in his denunciation.
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its own Indian affairs.139
Morris displayed little regard for the Susquehanna Delawares, the 
Indians closest to Pennsylvania’s frontier settlements. He presumed rather than 
cultivated the allegiance of the Susquehanna tributary tribes. In April 1755, 
less than three months before Braddock’s defeat, Teedyuscung and Paxinosa, 
chiefs respectively of the Susquehanna Delawares and Shawnees, visited 
Philadelphia along with a representation of neighboring Indians. Ostensibly, 
the Indians came to renew the chain of friendship. However, the Susquehanna 
Indians were suffering from a shortage of food and the anxiety brought on by 
conflicting French and English rhetoric. An unseasonable frost followed by 
drought had badly damaged the Indians’ corn crop .140 Paxinosa had begun to 
limit the distance that his hunters could range from their Wyoming Valley 
homes "so that upon any Occassion the Indians may soon be called together."141 
Compounding the uneasiness for the Susquehanna Indians this spring were the 
unwelcome arrivals at Shamokin of Indians who boasted of contact with the
139 Donald H. Kent, The French Invasion of W estern Pennsylvania. 1753 
(Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1954), 44; 
Jennings, Empire of Fortune. 188; Root, The Relations of Pennsylvania with 
the British Government. 297-98.
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141 Examination of John Schmick and Henry Frey, November 1755, Timothy 
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French.142 The Susquehanna Delawares no doubt expected gifts from the 
governor, but more important, their presence constituted a reconnaissance 
designed to get at the heart o f the government’s intentions.
On the second day of the conference, Teedyuscung produced a pipe and 
"some of the same good Tobacco that your and Our Uncles Grandfathers used 
to smoke together."143 To the Delawares and other Indian groups, smoking 
tobacco before formal discourse symbolically prepared the way for open 
communication and mutual understanding.144 Teedyuscung acknowledged the 
Delawares’ status as "women" at the center of the covenant chain between the 
Six Nations and Pennsylvania. At the same time, the Delaware chief revealed a 
sense of uncertainty over the future of the covenant chain. He spoke of a time 
when the "children" of the Delawares would come into the world and "see the 
Sun and Sky clear and the road open between Us and You." Teedyuscung 
hinted that the new generation of Delawares were free to appraise their 
subordinate position. The Delaware chief stated that he would "advise" (rather 
than order) his people "to take and always continue to hold the middle o f that 
C hain ."145
Teedyuscung spoke of the Six Nations, Pennsylvania, and the Delawares,
142 Examination of Philip Wesa and Godfrey W esler, November 10, 1755, ibid.
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respectively as "Two Sons and one Daughter," and emphasized that "they are 
all one Fam ily."146 The Delawares were prohibited from making war. In their 
role as peace-keeping "wom en," the Delawares expected that in times of unrest 
"the other nations who make war" would protect them .147 The Susquehanna 
Delawares were dutifully playing their role by deferring to the two powers that 
held the ends of the covenant chain. It was incumbent upon Pennsylvania and 
the Iroquois to take action now that the Delawares found themselves in an 
increasingly untenable situation.
W hen the Delawares had left for the day, Scarroyady reminded the 
council members that Teedyuscung’s gesture was intended "to induce Us to 
return them a Pipe of Tobacco." The Oneida chief suggested that the 
councilors simply impart a strong message regarding the importance of 
Delaware loyalty to the Six Nations along with the requisite tobacco.
Scarrroyady intended to draw the Delawares aside with his own "Pipe of 
Tobacco to smoak & ...to  give them the same good A dvice."148 W hat the 
Delawares needed more than this often-repeated message was tangible evidence 
that maintaining their passive position within the covenant chain would not 
result in their destruction.
146 Ibid.
147 David Zeisberger’s History of the North American Indians, ed. Archer 
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Governor M orris, who had just returned from a council o f war at 
Alexandria, informed the Indians of the upcoming expeditions against the 
French. In addition to Braddock’s mission against Fort Duquesne, W illiam 
Johnson was to lead a force against Crown Point. Johnson had also been 
commissioned to supervise British Indian affairs and to secure the Iroquois "and 
their Allies" to the British interest.149 M orris presented the Indians with a belt 
o f wampum from Johnson. The governor repeated Johnson’s request that the 
Delawares "not depart from [their] Habitations but wait for a message" from 
Onondaga following a conference betweeen the new superintendant and the 
Iroquois.150 The Susquehanna Indians prepared to return to their homes, having 
learned nothing that promised an immediate end to their predicament. M orris 
saw the Indian conference as routine. "The Susquehannah Indians expect a 
p resen t," he blithely informed the Assembly, "which need not be great as they 
have no Particular Business and only come down to assure Us of the 
Continuance of their Friendship."151
W hen a contingent of Wyandots appeared in Philadelphia one month 
after Braddock’s defeat, Morris was far more willing to attend to the needs of 
the tributary tribes. He took the occasion of the W yandots’ visit to offer the
149 W illiam L. Stone, The Life and Times of Sir William Johnson. Bart.
(Albany, New York: J. Munsell, 1865), I, 484; W allace, Conrad W eiser. 381.
150 Council Minutes, April 23, 1755, CR 6:371.
151 M orris to the Assembly, April 24, 1755, PA, 4th ser., 2:384-85.
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Assembly a more serious assessment of the state o f Indian affairs. The 
governor suggested that those Indians who could "be made hearty for us" might 
"prevent a Great Deal of Mischief, engage other Indians in our Favour, and be 
prepared for any other Service we may think proper to employ them in ." 
Securing their allegiance would require his own best efforts as well as the 
always reluctant financial assistance of the Assembly. "To do this," M orris 
now realized, "will require great Skill and an open Hand, for Presents they 
certainly expect, and will not at this Time be satisfied with small O nes."152
M orris knew that the impression his governorship made in London 
would be due in part to his handling of Pennsylvania’s Indians and he was 
eager to enhance his own political future in the British colonial administration. 
He attempted to accommodate both imperial and proprietary interests in his 
management of Indian affairs as well as in his ongoing battle with the Assembly 
over military appropriations. As Morris had prepared to leave London for 
Philadelphia, he suggested to Thomas Penn that the time might be right "to 
press the government to sett apart some annuall small sum for the defence of 
the British Empire in America to be applied to keeping the Indians in our 
In terest." In the same breath M orris deferentially added that the proprietor 
would be "best judge" of the m atter.153
152 M orris to the Assembly, August 12, 1755, PA, 8th ser., 5:3951.
153 M orris to Penn, June 8, 1754. Penn Manuscripts, Official Correspondence, 
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James H. Hutson’s analysis of M orris’s first attempt to secure military 
funds from the Assembly provides an example of the governor’s complicated 
agenda. The Assembly proposed a bill to support Braddock’s expedition that 
would have violated Thomas Penn’s instruction regarding paper money. The 
appropriation was to be sunk over ten years and would have provided the 
Assembly with an annual surplus of two thousand pounds. Following Governor 
Ham ilton’s precedent, Morris blocked the bill’s passage by insisting that it 
include a suspending clause. He had good reason to believe that his stand 
would make a favorable impression in London. Although the suspending clause 
was regarded as obsolete by the Assembly, the presidents of the Privy Council 
and the Board of Trade believed it to be still in effect. Yet, if M orris were to 
make any gains on behalf of the proprietary interest, he needed to inspire a 
willingness to compromise in the Assembly. In a confusing message to the 
Assembly, M orris came down on both sides of the issue. First, he offered to 
soften his position on the suspending clause in return for concessions on the 
length of the excise. He then made a long digression on the "inviolability" of 
the suspending clause. "It almost looked as though M orris were trying to hide 
his offer of a compromise from the scrutiny of British officialdom ," Hutson 
suggested.154
Both the Assembly and Thomas Penn found Morris to be unusually
154 Hutson, "Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics," 340.
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preoccupied with his reputation in Britain.155 In August 1755, the Assembly 
accused M orris of making "plausible speeches" designed to be well received by 
those unfamiliar with his daily handling of affairs in Philadelphia. "Indeed," 
the Assembly continued sarcastically, the governor’s messages appeared "not to 
be made so much for us as for others: to shew the Ministry at home his great 
Zeal for his M ajesty’s Service and concern for the W elfare of his People!"156
M orris did seek the favor of the Newcastle administration. The Duke of 
Newcastle had created a powerful bureaucracy while serving as secretary of 
state for the southern department. The Newcastle administration’s influence 
was based on the extensive distribution of colonial patronage and strong 
advocacy of the royal prerogative in the colonies.157 M orris’s dogged efforts on 
behalf of New Jersey’s proprietors had ultimately won him the governorship of 
Pennsylvania. He now held a highly visible position from which to display his 
talents to London. However, Morris could neither afford to compromise 
Thomas Penn’s instructions nor the proprietor’s political goal of limiting the 
power o f the Assembly. Morris had cited imperial considerations to Secretary 
of State Thomas Robinson as his reason for vetoing the Assembly’s supply bill. 
Penn was quick to rebuke his lieutenant governor. "I think you had better have 
avoided giving some of the reasons you did for not passing the Bills," Penn
155 Ibid.
156 Assembly to M orris, August 19,1755, CR 6:583.
157 Ibid.: Jennings Empire of Fortune. 112-13.
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advised M orris, "as those Reasons were more propper for a Governor in a 
King’s Governm ent."158 Until M orris’s position in London was secure, his 
political future lay largely in the hands of Thomas Penn.
In his first official speech to the Assembly, Morris had declared that the 
French presence on the Ohio had "turned the Eyes of Europe" upon 
Pennsylvania and warned that the "Conduct of these Colonies will be more than 
ever the Object o f their attention, and ours in particular, who are most 
immediately concerned."159 In August 1754, Lord Halifax, the president of the 
Board of Trade, had presented the crown with a plan to centralize the 
administration of colonial Indian affairs. Halifax understood the impact that a 
strong British alliance with the Six Nations could have in a North American 
war against France. The handling of Indian affairs by the individual colonies 
would never secure Onondaga’s full cooperation.160 Halifax had neither time 
nor patience to deal with colonies that might resist surrendering control over 
their own Indian affairs. He informed the king that the need for a single 
authority in Indian affairs was "so apparent, that we hope no difficulty will 
occur on their p a rt."161 Under Halifax’s plan, a superintendent was to be
158 Penn to M orris, May 29, 1755, PA, 1st ser., 2:334.
159 Morris to the Assembly, October 1754, CR 6:186.
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State of New York (Albany: Weed, Parsons & Company, 1855) [hereafter cited 
as NYCD1. 6:902.
64
appointed. Each colony was responsible for building forts and "establishing & 
subsisting such Commissarys in such Forts as shall appear to be necesssary for 
the management of Indian services."162 Halifax intended to take strong 
measures against provincial governments that failed to cooperate. "We see no 
other method that can be taken," he argued, "but that of an application for an 
interposition of the Authority o f Parliam ent."163
Thomas Penn was as committed to protecting the proprietary interest 
from the interference of the royal government as he was from the Assembly. 
Consequently, Penn exercised "great caution" in his dealings with Lord Halifax. 
In 1753, Penn warned his provincial secretary, Richard Peters, to be equally 
circumspect in his reports to Halifax. Penn worried that the Board of Trade 
might become overly concerned by the deep antagonisms that divided 
Pennsylvania’s government. Indiscretion on the part of proprietary officials 
might bring about "disagreeable consequences" in the form of unwanted 
"assistance" from London. Penn later urged Morris to use similar caution.
The proprietor feared that once Parliament stepped in, "they may go further 
than either the Government or the Colonys wish they w ould."164 Near the end 
o f M orris’s first year in office, Penn declared himself pleased with his
162 Ibid., 901
163 Ibid.
164 Quoted in Mabel Pauline Wolff, The Colonial Agency of Pennsylvania, 
1712-1757 (Philadephia, 1933), 165.
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lieutenant governor’s "disinclination to write to the Board of Trade." In Penn’s 
view, M orris’s chief responsibility was to advance the proprietary interest in 
Pennsylvania. Penn preferred to handle alone the more subtle task o f keeping 
imperial officials at bay while presenting them with the image of a well- 
governed and loyal province. "We ought to shew our selves to serve the 
publick as any Kings Governor," Penn explained to Richard Peters, "but should 
not too easily submit to all the orders they are pleased to send them ."165
In November 1754, Lord Halifax ordered Morris to cooperate with 
General Edward Braddock "in everything he shall think necessary for His 
M ajesty’s Service."166 M orris then began to organize Indian support for 
Braddock’s expedition. Secretary Peters recommended that M orris enlist 
George Croghan’s assistance in Indian matters. Peters had simultaneously 
hinted to Croghan that the Assembly might be persuaded to relieve him of his 
financial debts in return for his service among the Indians.167
Croghan wanted to salvage his reputation in Pennsylvania. After 
achieving spectacular success in the Indian trade, Croghan had lost much of his 
fortune. He was now heavily in debt and lived at Aughwick to avoid arrest and 
legal proceedings initiated by his Philadelphia creditors. Croghan was largely
165 Penn to Peters, July 3, 1755, Gratz Manuscripts, Case 2, Box 33-a,
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responsible for Pennsylvania’s profitable contact with the Ohio Indians. In 
1751, Croghan had attempted to protect his own trade interests by telling the 
Assembly that the Ohio Indians wanted the province to establish a fort to guard 
against French encroachment. The subsequent testimony of the Indian 
interpreter Andrew Montour showed that Croghan had lied. Croghan fell into 
disrepute with Philadelphia’s Quaker elite.168 However, the Ohio Indians had 
now been left vulnerable to French overtures, and imperial authorities were 
increasingly impatient with the provincial handling of Indian affairs. The 
proprietary leaders could not afford to ignore George Croghan’s influence and 
his unique vantage point on the rapidly changing conditions on the frontier.
Conrad W eiser’s August and September accounts of the situation at 
Aughwick were already out of date. With only a week remaining before the 
Assembly was due to meet on December third, M orris contacted Croghan. The 
governor wanted first-hand information on the "sentiments, Inclinations, 
resolutions & expectations of the Indians" to present to the legislature. M orris 
also noted that fresh intelligence was "absolutely necessary for his M ajesty’s 
service and the Interest of these Colonys." Making the most of Croghan’s 
vulnerable situation, the governor placed his new operative under extreme
168 Nicholas W ainwright, "An Indian Trade Failure: The Story of the Hockley, 
Trent and Croghan Company" PM HB. LXXII (1948), 366-69. For an analysis 
of Croghan’s Indian diplomacy, his trade failures and his self-imposed exile, 
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Passing," 400-03, 417-21.
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pressure. "If you should fail in this," Morris warned, "the proper measures for 
his Majestys service may be retarded and the Indians disappointed."169 Other 
than underscoring the Indians’ anticipation of food and clothing from 
Philadelphia, Croghan could only report the widespread fear o f "French 
Indians" among the Aughwick refugees. "This is all I know of thire Sentiments 
att present," he concluded.170
Thomas Penn’s instructions also required M orris to promote the 
settlement of the newly-purchased prorietary land between the Alleghany 
Mountains and the Ohio. By October 1754, Penn acknowledged that French 
control of the Ohio temporarily precluded any attempt to settle the region.
From  London, Penn wrote M orris that "I would not put any People upon such 
an undertaking til there is a probability o f securing our possession." However, 
Penn confidently reported that "We are preparing here to do i t ." His plan for 
the settlement of the Ohio land rested on the news that a military expedition 
against the French was being readied in Ireland under General Edward 
Braddock.171 Penn clearly hoped to benefit from this advantageous union of 
proprietary economic interest and Britain’s military strategy in North America.
If M orris had any misgivings over Penn’s aggressive pursuit of Indian
169 M orris to Croghan, November 25, 1754, PA, 1st ser., 2:203.
170 Croghan to M orris, December 2, 1754, PA, 1st ser., 2:210.
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land in the face of the volatile situation in the west, he kept his own counsel. It 
took Braddock’s defeat and the Delaware uprising to incite Penn’s adversaries 
in the Assembly to probe the nature of Pennsylvania’s Indian land acquisitions. 
W hen the Assembly suggested that the Indians’ dissatisfaction with land 
purchases might explain the frontier attacks, Morris steadfastly defended the 
proprietary interest. Through the remainder of his governorship and even after 
he left office, M orris insisted that Pennsylvania had practiced a consistent 
policy of "just and favourable treatment of the Indians." He argued that the 
Delawares had been emboldened by the French and "induced" to attack by "the 
weak and defenseless state of the English frontiers" and the Assembly’s 
"Pacifist Influence."172
As the Delaware war effort gained momentum in late 1755, M orris 
received a report concerning the cause of the Indian attacks. He passed on the 
information to General W illiam Shirley, the commander of British forces in 
North America, but he would not reveal the source in w riting.173 M orris had 
learned that the Delaware leaders were telling their people that the war had
172 Assembly to M orris, November 5, 1755, CR 6:678; M orris to the 
Assembly, November 22, 1755, Ibid.:728. "Affadavit of Robert Hunter M orris, 
Esq.," November 28, 1758, Penn Manuscripts, Indian Affairs, Volume 3, 
1757-1772, 66, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
173 W illiam Shirley succeeded Edward Braddock as commander-in-chief o f 
British forces in North America after the latter’s demise at the battle at 
Monongahela. While leading troops in the field, Shirley continued to serve as 
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been initiated "to Recover their Lands, & Reduce both the English & French to 
Narrower Bounds." The governor called the rationale "Meer Pretense" and 
declared that "those Indians are intirely under the Direction of the F rench ." He 
added bitterly that the French had employed a "good Policy, as they can no 
way Make war so Cheap as by employing Body’s of Indians."174
If M orris could not conceive that the Delawares would act independently 
in defense of their lands; he held no such illusions about their Iroquois 
superiors. M orris saw a very real correlation between questionable land 
purchases and Indian violence when the prospective buyers were whites from 
outside the colony and the Indian land lay within Pennsylvania’s boundaries. In 
July 1754, the Pennsylvania commissioners at the Albany Conference first 
encountered the Connecticut-based Susquehanna Company. John Henry 
Lydius, an Indian trader headquartered in Albany, was now the company’s 
agent and had approached several Iroquois leaders. Lydius hoped to convince 
them to sell the Delaware and Shawnee homeland between the two great forks 
of the Susquehanna River. The Susquehanna Company claimed that the land 
was situated "within the Latitude of the Connecticut C harter."175 The 
Pennsylvania commissioners protested to the Iroquois that the land in question
174 M orris to W illiam Shirley, December 3, 1755, Papers of Sir W illiam 
Johnson. II, 369.
175 John Penn and Richard Peters to Governor James Hamilton, July 1754, CR 
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lay "in the Centre of their Province." They reminded the sachems that by 
treaty in 1737, the Six Nations had agreed to sell "no Lands within the Bounds 
of ye Pennsylvania Charter to any but the Proprietaries of Pennsylvania."176 
Hendrick Peters, a Mohawk sachem, told the proprietary commissioners that 
there was no need to quarrel with the Connecticut m en over the Susquehanna 
land. "We will not part with it to either of you," Hendrick stated flatly, "We 
will reserve it for our W estern Indians to live o n ."177 However, Hendrick did 
not speak for all the leaders of the Six Nations. By the end of 1754, Lydius 
had already secured the signatures of several prominent Iroquois to the deed 
and was working to obtain m ore.178
In December, Morris informed Thomas Penn that "The Connecticut 
affair, nothwithstanding what Pass’d at Albany, has taken a very bad turn, and 
a Purchase is actually m ade."179 In November, Morris had placed 
Pennsylvania’s case before W illiam Johnson and asked him to help arrange a 
meeting with Hendrick in Philadelphia. Based on Hendrick’s assurances at 
Albany and his apparently friendly disposition toward Pennsylvnia, M orris 
intended to use the Mohawk sachem to press the proprietary cause at
176 Ib id ..112.
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179 M orris to Penn, December 24, 1754, PA, 1st ser., 2:224.
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Onondaga.180
The foundation of M orris’s opposition to the Susquehanna Company 
rested on legal grounds. He could not see how the Iroquois leadership could 
justify the sale. "Whenever the Six Nations shall in their publick Council 
consider this Deed made by Lydius," M orris confidently told W illiam Johnson, 
"they will deem it a Violation of publick Faith and an arrant piece of F raud ."181 
M orris held that "By the Laws of England and of this Country No M an 
whatsoever" had the authority to initiate private negotiations or land sales with 
the Indians "without a Lycence first Obtained from the Government in which 
such Land lyes." According to M orris, not only were unsanctioned land 
purchases void "but the person making the purchase is highly Criminal, and so 
are all those that pretend to hold Lands under it."182
Some Pennsylvanians, M orris noted angrily, were eager to take up land 
in the Susquehanna region along with the Connecticut settlers. M orris could 
not resist an opportunity to accuse his political enemies in New Jersey of 
exacerbating the situation. The governor informed Thomas Penn that the 
Pennsylvania settlers intended to hold the land "by force as the Jersey men do." 
W ere it not for the "effect that the Impunity of the Jersey Rioters has upon the 
People here," Morris complained, "this affair may Possibly Blow over."
180 M orris to Johnson, November 15, 1754, CR 6:251.
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M orris quietly conceded to Penn that the solution lay in persuading the Six 
Nations to negate the purchase.183
Legality aside, when it came to the politics of approaching the divided 
council o f the Six Nations, the governor was less sanguine and more 
calculating. M orris asked for W illiam Johnson’s cooperation in keeping 
Hendrick ignorant of the specific reason he was being summoned to 
Philadelphia. "Indians do not like to blame one another," Morris explained, 
"and should he be told beforehand that this is the Business he is sent for he may 
decline in com ing."184 M orris apparently thought that Hendrick would be more 
receptive while enjoying the governor’s hospitality far from the influence of the 
Six Nations. Hendrick was told only that the governor wished to consult with 
him "on some Affairs in which the safety of the Indians and his Majesties 
Colonies are very much concerned." Morris flattered the Mohawk chief by 
declaring that, as the new governor, he could not speak "to the Council o f the 
Six Nations till I know your M ind."185
W illiam Johnson informed Morris that he had spoken to Hendrick 
"concerning the affair as far as I judged necessary." Johnson emphasized 
Hendrick’s disapproval of the Susquehanna deed and assured M orris that the
183 M orris to Penn, December 24, 1754, PA, 1st ser., 2:224.
184 Ibid.
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73
chief had promised to work on Pennsylvania’s behalf.186 To provincial 
secretary Richard Peters, Johnson provided a more telling assessment o f the 
divisions within the Six Nations. Johnson informed the secretary that initially 
Hendrick had refused to go to Philadelphia. Johnson was able to allay 
Hendrick’s "Fears and Uneasiness" only after extensive discussions and 
"promising to jo in  and back him here among the Six N ations."187
After approaching Hendrick, M orris turned his attention to Connecticut 
Governor Thomas Fitch. M orris lectured his Connecticut counterpart with a 
self-serving history of Pennsylvania’s Indian treaties and land claims. M orris 
made no mention of the Iroquois appropriation of Delaware land rights and the 
ensuing Pennsylvania-Six Nations alliance that had facilitated the colony’s land 
acquisitions. He made only a fleeting reference to the presence of the 
Delawares and other tributaries. M orris insisted that the "Six United Nations 
of Indians and their Allies the Susquehannahs" had several times "publicly 
acknowledged, ratified, and confirmed" the provincial boundaries claimed by 
Pennsylvania. The Susquehanna Company, on the other hand, had embarked 
on a "wild Scheme" that threatened to "bring on an Indian W ar in the Bowels 
of this Province."188
186 Johnson to M orris, December 9, 1754, CR 6:268.
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Governor Morris had just received a wampum belt and message from 
John Shickelamy, an Oneida chief and his late father’s successor as Iroquois 
supervisor at Shamokin. Shickelamy reported that the Connecticut settlers had 
begun arriving in the region. "I desire you to send to these people not to 
com e,” he said, "and if you do not prevent it I shall be oblig’d to complain to 
the Six N ations."189 Shickelamy was acting in strict accordance with the 
directives he had been given by the Six Nations.
Just before Hendrick signed the Albany deed in July, he had placed a 
condition on the sale. Shickelamy would notify Philadelphia o f any white 
incursion into the Suquahanna reserve. The proprietaries would then become 
responsible for removing all white settlers regardless o f whether they were 
Pennsylvanians "or from other Provinces." If the government were to "fail in 
this Application," Hendrick warned, "We will come ourselves and turn them 
o ff." Hendrick had imposed what amounted to a military obligation on the 
Pennsylvania commissioners. He firmly reminded the Pennsylvanians a second 
time that the Susquehanna territory would remain Indian land and then told 
them to go and "Get your Deed ready as fast as You can ."190
M orris worked feverishly to prevent the collision of the Iroquois and the 
Connecticut settlers on the Susquehanna. He summoned Scarroyady for a brief
189 W eslager, The Delaware Indians. 192; M orris’s instructions to Scarroyady,
December 24, 1754, CR 6:216.
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meeting and then dispatched the Oneida leader to Onondaga with orders to 
"Enquire into this Affair and set it right." M orris could hardly contain his 
frustration. Proprietary land hunger had placed his government into an 
unwanted role in an internal Iroquois affair. "Tell them," he ordered 
Scarroyady, "it is their doing not ours, if John Shickalamy is disturbed." The 
governor fretted over the implications that the Susquehanna problem  carried for 
the Pennsylvania-Six Nations alliance and the colony’s obligation to Britain’s 
struggle with the French. W ithin the space of a single sentence, M orris 
waivered between support and non-involvement regarding the Iroquois defense 
of the Susquehanna lands. He lamented that both Pennsylvania and the Six 
Nations would be "put to the Trouble of driving away these People if they 
come." But when he expressed his fear of war to Scarroyady, he defined it as 
a potential conflict between "your People and these Strangers." (M orris did not 
share with Scarroyady his belief that many of the intruders might be 
Pennsylvanians). The governor concluded by emphasizing that hostilities on the 
Susquehanna would "hinder" the Six Nations and Pennsylvania "from fighting 
the F rench ."191
Scarroyady’s reply to M orris mirrored the governor’s view of the 
Susquehanna Company’s design. The Oneida chief described Lydius as a "Vile 
M an ," who had thus far succeeded through deceit and ample bribes of money
191 M orris’s instructions to Scarroyady, December 24, 1754, CR 6:217.
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and liquor. Scarroyady declared that once the issue was presented in its true 
light at Onondaga, the Six Nations Council would cancel the deed.192
In early January 1755, Hendrick arrived in Philadelphia with an 
entourage of Mohawks. Hendrick agreed with M orris and his advisors that the 
Susquehanna purchase was a "false Proceeding," but could offer no guarantees 
that the sale could be easily overturned. He recommended that Pennsylvania 
send a delegation to each of the Six Nations to review the deed. The only 
permanent solution was to compel the Six Nations and the Connecticut 
government to "cancel the Deed in a T reaty ."193
To involve the Connecticut government in the process would establish a 
dangerous precedent. The proprietary leadership resolved to undercut the 
Susquehanna deed rather than confront it as a legitimate document. Richard 
Peters argued that Pennsylvania required a deed from the Six Nations for the 
entire extent o f the colony’s grant. "Unless this be done," he told W illiam 
Johnson, "it will always be in the power o f such men as Lydius to disturb the 
Peace of the Government and to breed endless distractions."194
Thomas Penn disagreed with Peters’ proposal. The proprietor 
complimented Morris on his overall handling of the Susquehanna affair, but 
favored a more aggressive approach toward the Six Nations. Penn balked at
192 Ibid.
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"making a purchase of these worthless Indians, til they have demanded the 
Deed from the people of Connecticut." He would have preferred M orris to 
send Conrad W eiser to Onondaga than to bring Hendrick to Philadelphia. Once 
the Six Nations were compelled to destroy the Susquehanna deed, Penn 
recommended that Pennsylvania make an overall purchase. However, Penn 
advocated paying the Iroquois in kind "to the value of two or three hundred 
pounds Currency every three years forever." The proprietor argued that the 
extended payments would place the Six Nations "in a kind of dependence on 
us" that would ward off the influence of the French.195 Penn overestimated 
Pennsylvania’s ability to dictate such strong terms at Onondaga. W hile in 
Philadelphia, Hendrick had informed Morris and the provincial council that a 
majority of the Six Nations now sided with the French. "You are weak," the 
sachem told the Pennsylvanians, "You build no strong Houses, You send 
Persons only to trade amongst Us who consult their own Interest and often 
impose on U s ."196
By June, M orris could offer Shickalamy only a temporary and largely 
symbolic response to his complaint. Morris intended to send a team of 
surveyors to determine the exact boundary between the Albany purchase and 
the Susquehanna reserve. The governor would then issue a proclamation
195 Penn to M orris, July 2, 1755, PA, 1st ser., 2:370-71.
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forbidding settlement within the Iroquois claim. "If after this any shall presume 
to settle," he concluded lamely, "they will be punished."197 One month later, 
Braddock’s defeat would set the stage for the Delawares to take matters into 
their own hands.
In April, General Edward Braddock asked M orris to supply the army 
with an escort comprised of "Indians in your Province that formerly liv’d near 
the River O hio."198 M orris immediately wrote to Croghan at Aughwick and 
ordered him to organize as many Indians as possible to jo in  Braddock’s 
expedition. Croghan was to tell the "Six Nations, Delawares, Shawonese, 
Twightwees, and Owendats" of the Ohio that they would be aiding the king’s 
efforts to reclaim the Ohio from the French and return it to the Indians. M orris 
enclosed a copy of Braddock’s official request, but added a pointed rem inder of 
his own. "You are sensible," M orris wrote "that the larger the Number the 
m ore credit it will be to this province."199 But the Albany purchase was still 
fresh in the minds of the Delawares and Shawnees. For the time being, M orris 
left it to Croghan to explain to the Indians at Aughwick the glaring 
inconsistency between the stated intentions of king and proprietor regarding 
their land.
On May 1, Croghan reported back that he had summoned the Delawares
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and Shawnees "such as can be found on this side the French fort." He had also 
sent word to the Susquehanna Indians.200 Three weeks later both Braddock and 
Croghan related that approximately fifty Indians had joined the expedition and 
that the messengers had not yet returned from the Susquehanna. Braddock 
explained that he was sending the women and children back into the province 
and informed Morris that he had promised the Indians that the governor "would 
take Particular care of ’em. "201
Richard Peters, who had just returned from Aughwick, painted a 
troubling picture of Braddock’s encampment. Braddock had in fact ordered the 
Indian women out of the camp because of rampant "prostitution." The British 
officers were "scandalously fond" of the "Squas," who turned their earnings 
over to the Indian men. M ore disturbing was Peters’ report that Braddock had 
refused to consult with the Indians and the latter were highly resentful. "High 
quarrels" had taken place between the general and the Indians.202 In 
Philadelphia, one month after the decisive battle, the Seneca chief Kanuksusy 
vented his anger at the treatment he had received from Braddock. "He is now 
dead," the chief said, "but he was a bad man when he was alive; he looked 
upon us as dogs and would never hear anything we said to him ." Kanuksusy
200 Croghan to M orris, May 1, 1755, CR 6:374-75.
201 Braddock to M orris, May 20, 1755, CR 6:398; Croghan to M orris, Ibid. . 
399.
202 Peters to the Council, June 2, 1755, CR 6:397.
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went on to relate that Braddock’s contempt for the Indians had driven most of 
the warriors to leave the expedition.203
Braddock’s refusal to treat the Indians as full allies was only part of the 
reason they abandoned him. Shingas, a Delaware chief and one of the leaders 
o f the Delaware uprising in the west, had been at Braddock’s camp. In 
November 1755, Shingas related his experiences with Braddock to Charles 
Stuart, a prisoner of the Delawares. In two separate discussions with several 
Ohio chiefs, Braddock had confirmed the Indians’ worst suspicions. The 
general bluntly told the Indians that "No Savage Should Inherit the Land" once 
the French had been defeated. The Indians protested that if that were the case, 
they would not fight with the British. In a moment o f supreme arrogance, 
Braddock bid them leave, telling them that "he did not need their H elp."204
From  the time he heard Peters’ Aughwick account, M orris wrote at least 
seven letters to Braddock before the general was killed in battle. Not once did 
the governor raise the subject o f the Indians’ reported dissatisfaction or the 
conditions at the camp. Indeed, M orris made no reference or inquiry of any 
sort regarding the Indian allies in these final letters.205 M orris was well aware 
that procuring a large Indian escort for a successful campaign would benefit his
203 Kanuksusy to the Council, August 22, 1755, CR 6:589.
204 Quoted in Jennings, Empire of Fortune. 154-55.
205 See the letters of Morris to Braddock, CR 6: 407,408,415,429,461,476 and 
PA , 1st ser., 2:373.
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reputation. Having a victorious British general speak of him in London as a 
meddler who was overly concerned with the welfare of Indians would do him 
little good. General Braddock probably would have regarded M orris’s advice 
on Indian diplomacy as civilian interference with his command. As soon as he 
arrived in Virginia, Braddock indicated that he was not a man to be trifled 
with. Braddock warned Morris that he would "have Regard to the different 
Behaviour of the several colonies." W hat the general could not obtain 
voluntarily from the colonies, he was ready to "repair by unpleasant 
M ethods."206 M orris played the sycophant in his correspondence with 
Braddock. He professed that he was "sorry" and "ashamed" over the initial 
reluctance of the Assembly to provide recruits and supplies. The governor 
readily funneled the blame toward the Assembly for all o f Braddock’s 
complaints.207
In London, two months after Braddock’s defeat, Thomas Penn received 
word of the disaster. In a letter to M orris, Penn noted that in the accounts of 
the battle he had read, he found no mention "of our Indians which you wrote 
me Braddock had engaged to go with him." Penn was "perplexed" and hoped 
to receive "a very particular account of this affair."208 Morris had already sent 
an explanation of sorts in which he volunteered nothing that could reflect badly
206 Braddock to M orris, February 28, 1755, CR 6:307.
207 M orris to Braddock, M arch 12, 1755, CR 6:336-37.
208 Penn to M orris, September 19, 1755, PA, 1st ser., 2:419.
82
on his lack of attention to the Indian allies. Braddock had underestimated the 
enemy, Morris explained, and eschewed the "Indian manner o f fighting." 
M oreover, Morris expressed his surprise that Colonel Thomas Dunbar would 
withdraw the army in the face of inferior French and Indian numbers. "But 
that you may form your Judgement of this Affair," M orris wrote, "I send you 
all the Letters and Papers that have come to me upon that head. "209
By the late autumn of 1755, the Delaware uprising had begun in the 
west. The Susquehanna Delawares could no longer remain neutral. Governor 
M orris had sent Scarroyady on several dangerous missions before and during 
the war. The Oneida chief had kept the governor apprised of the level o f 
French influence among the Six Nations. He was one of a handful of Indians 
who remained with Braddock’s force until the disastrous end of the campaign. 
At Monongahela, Scarroyady was nearly captured and his son was killed.210 
The Oneida chief was undaunted. By September 1755, Scarroyady was eager 
to take his small Iroquois-led band from Shamokin against the French forts on 
the Ohio. He was frustrated by M orris’s evasive responses when he pressed 
the governor for support.211
In early November, Scarroyady appeared in Philadelphia and asked to 
speak to the Assembly on behalf of the Susquehanna Indians. In a speech that
209 M orris to Penn, July 31, 1755, CR 6:517.
210 CR 6:456; Boyd, ed. Indian Treaties Printed bv Franklin, lxix.
211 Scarroyady to M orris, September 11, 1755, CR 6:615-16.
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historian Julian P. Boyd called "the most dramatic spectacle that the State 
House saw prior to the Revolution," Scarroyady handed Pennsylvania an 
ultim atum .212 First, the Oneida chief addressed the governor and council. He 
stated that two Ohio Delawares claiming to speak for the French had come to 
the Indian town at Big Island. The two Delawares warned the Susquehanna 
Indians to move from the river so as not to impede the coming onslaught 
against Pennsylvania. The "Indians among the White people" who inhabited 
the M oravian missions were singled out and threatened with death. The Ohio 
Delawares boasted that they would be "followed by a thousand French and 
Indians." The Susquehanna Indians were offered a "little hatchet" befitting 
their status as women. The Delawares were taken aside as a group and 
promised an abundance of ammunition once they reached the Ohio.213
W hen Morris brought the Assembly before him, Scarroyady did not 
mention the visit of the Ohio Delawares, but spoke only of the "imminent 
danger." He told the audience that he had given the Susquehanna Delawares a 
belt "with the Hatchet in it" to which they had tied a belt of their own "to make 
the Hatchet the Sharper & give it the greater w eight." Scarroyady pitched the 
two belts on the table before him. "I must deal plainly with You," he said, 
breaking the silence in the crowded chamber, "and tell you if you will not fight
212 Boyd, ed. Indian Treaties Printed bv Franklin, lxix.
213 Scarroyady to Morris and the Provincial Council, November 8, 1755, CR 
6:683.
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with us we will go somewhere else." His Delaware charges would not prove 
their loyalty by sacrificing themselves for an ally who refused to act.
Scarroyady then pointedly denied that his people were responsible for any of 
the recent killing on the frontier. "Brethren," he concluded, "I have done for 
the present. "214
M orris seized the drama of the moment and asked the Assembly to 
adjourn to their own chamber and consider a bill for providing defense money. 
The governor and the Assembly had been deadlocked for months on the issue. 
The Assembly proposed to fund the military expenditures by levying a tax on 
all the lands in the province. Morris would not sign the bill because the 
Assembly refused to exclude Thomas Penn’s proprietary estates from the 
assessment.215 The governor was increasingly aware that his continuing 
opposition to the legislation was becoming a political liability. Either Morris 
could surrender to the Assembly or face "bearing the blame here and in 
England of refusing to contribute any thing towards the defense of the 
Province."216
M orris had begun to alienate even stalwart members of Pennsylvania’s 
proprietary group. In the spring of 1755, Richard Peters complained bitterly to 
Thomas Penn of M orris’s vitriolic style of governance and his relentless attacks
214 Ibid., 686.
215 M orris to the Assembly, August 6, 1755, CR 6:526.
216 M orris to Penn, July 31, 1755, CR 6:518.
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on the Quaker-dominated Assembly. Penn had appointed M orris for those very 
reasons. "I must certainly think that the manner in which you write o f the 
governor,'' Penn replied, ''proceeds from a desire to have public affairs happily 
conducted and also from your real regard to us and our G overnor." Penn 
allowed that Morris was "too impetuous," but scolded Peters on the grounds 
that his "caution may be carryed too far." The proprietor was both insulted and 
somewhat bemused by what he interpreted as Peters’ undue reserve and naivete. 
"I shall I think only observe," Penn concluded, "that I wonder you could take 
M r. M orris for a calm m an."217
During the final year of his governorship, M orris struggled with the 
Assembly over a milita bill which he considered weak and ineffectual. Morris 
also resisted an Indian Trade Bill through which the Assembly hoped to 
appropriate control over Indian Affairs. His last challenge as governor came at 
the Treaty o f Easton where he came face to face with Teedyuscung, the leader 
of the Delaware uprising on the Susquehanna. Exhausted from battling the 
Assembly and attempting to maintain control of the war-torn frontier, M orris 
resigned the governorship, probably under pressure, in August 1756.218
217 Penn to Peters, July 3, 1755, Gratz Manuscripts, Case 2, Box 33-a, 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
218 Thayer, Israel Pemberton. 118.
CONCLUSION
Robert Hunter M orris’s governorship marked the extent o f his 
advancement in American provincial politics. He ultimately returned to New 
Jersey where he continued to serve as chief justice until his death in 1764.219 
Villified by his contemporaries as well as later historians, Morris was one of 
Pennsylvania’s most unpopular colonial leaders. In August 1755, Benjamin 
Franklin wrote that Morris was "the rashest and most indiscreet Governor" he 
had encountered in provincial politics. Four months later, as war engulfed the 
frontier, Franklin declared him to be "half a Madman" and worried that if 
M orris was not soon removed from office, Pennsylvania’s government would 
become "the worst on the continent. "220 Nearly two centuries later, historian 
Theodore Thayer argued that "Governor M orris and the Quaker Assembly used 
the Indian menace and the miserable plight of the frontier as a lever by which 
to gain political advantages."221 Francis Jennings condemned the governor’s 
attempt to obscure the Assembly’s response to the frontier crisis through
219 Krout, "Robert Hunter M orris," 242.
220 Franklin to Peter Collinson, August 27, 1755; Franklin to Richard Partridge, 
November 27, 1755, Leonard Labaree, ed. The Papers of Beniamin Franklin 
(New Haven, 1963), VI, 169, 273.
221 Theodore Thayer, Israel Pemberton: King of the Quakers (Philadelphia, 
1940), 83.
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"skilful lying" to British military authorities.222
While M orris was in England in 1758, Thomas Penn asked his former 
governor to prepare an affadavit concerning the Delaware uprising. Penn 
wished "more particularly" to record whether M orris had received any 
complaint from the Indians regarding "Wrongs or Injurys done to them (or 
alleged to be done to them) by the Proprietarys or the Government of 
Pensilvania in or about any Purchase of Lands." If the Indians had registered 
no such protest, M orris was asked to explain by what other causes the 
"Defection of the Indians" might have proceeded. In his response, M orris 
carefully followed Penn’s line of reason and categorically absolved the 
Pennsylvania proprietary of any responsibility for the Indian w ar.223
Morris attempted to characterize the Ohio Indians’ attacks within 
Pennsylvania as no more than a local manifestation of a much wider set of 
conditions common to the entire British frontier. The "intrigues of the French" 
was the foremost reason for the violence of the Ohio tribes. Secondly, the 
frauds of unspecified "English traders" were to blame. Finally, the "neglect of 
the English governments" in failing to fortify the entire frontier in time created 
an opportunity for the Indians to advance unimpeded into Pennsylvania. The 
"publick hostilities" of the Ohio Indians, Morris pointed out, "first began on the
222 Jennings, Empire of Fortune. 142.
223 "Affadavit of Robert Hunter M orris," 66.
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frontiers of Virginia and Maryland and [only] after the Defeat of General 
Braddock were carried into Pensilvania."224
The Susquehanna Delawares had been compelled to jo in  forces against 
Pennsylvania by the more numerous Ohio tribes. M orris recounted 
Scarroyady’s momentous visit to Philadelphia in minute detail and cited the 
Iroquois ch ie fs  failure to move the Assembly to action as the turning point. 
W ithout the aid o f the Assembly, Morris argued "he could not make a full and 
satisfactory Answer to [Scarroyady’s] Demand."225
"Some time after Scarroyady’s speech" Morris recalled hearing that the 
Delawares were claiming that fraudulent land purchases had driven tham to 
war. The governor insisted that no such complaint had been made during the 
many conferences he had attended during the latter part o f his term. Owing to 
the absence of any general protests over ill-gotten land or to any "particular 
Instance" of land fraud, M orris smugly concluded that the charge "so far as it 
related to the Proprietarys, or Government of Pensilvania, was a mere Pretense, 
and without Foundation. "226
The deadlocked government and M orris’s increasingly contentious bouts 
with the Asembly alienated even the proprietary party in Pennsylvania.
Thomas Penn began to search for a successor to his unpopular governor. His
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
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first choice was Thomas Pownall, Lord Loudoun’s "Secretary Extraordinary" in 
the British colonies. Pownall’s popularity and influence was on the rise within 
the colonial administration. Pownall insisted that many of Penn’s instructions 
and constraints be lifted before he would accept the of proprietary 
governorship. Penn refused and Pownall declined the office.227
Pownall circulated a list of his reasons for refusing the Pennsylvania 
governorship.228 In effect, the document comprised a critical annotation of the 
proprietary instructions. Pownall took issue with Penn’s insistence that the 
governor help foster the creation of settlements in western Pennsylvania. While 
Robert Hunter Morris could declare that as governor he had been unaware of 
Indian dissatisfaction with Pennsylvania’s land acquisitions, Pownall could not 
not make the same assurance from his vantage point. Pownall opposed the 
settlement of the Ohio country on the grounds that it was a "measure highly 
offensive" to the Indians. "The Indians look upon those Lands as rightly 
belonging to them," he declared of the Albany Purchase territory, "and have 
several times Declared their Resolution not to part with them ." Pownall 
harkened back to W illiam Penn’s original intent when he recommended that the 
proprietary discourage settlement "on Lands claimed by the Indians, until the
227 John A. Shutz, Thomas Pownall. British Defender of American Liberty: A
Study of Anglo-American Relations in the Eighteenth Century (Glendale, 
California: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1951), 70-71.
228 Ibid.
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Rights be settled to their satisfation. "229
229 "Governor Pownalls Reasons For Declining The Government of 
Pennsylvania," PM HB. XIII, 445-46.
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